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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on macroeconomics and forecasting.
Central banks have recently engaged in unconventional monetary policies at
the zero lower bound, where their forecasts play a crucial role in signaling the
future path of monetary policy. The work presented herein investigates the
effect of monetary policy announcements at the zero lower bound in Japan, and
evaluates the efficiency of forecasts that are explicitly tied to monetary policy
decisions in the United States.
The first chapter investigates the effects of monetary policy announcements
at the zero lower bound using Japanese data from 1998 to 2013. I find that the
effect of expansionary monetary policy shocks is directly passed on to corpo-
rate bond yields, notably for high-grade corporate bond yields. However, the
magnitude of estimated pass-through to stock prices and the exchange rate is
substantially smaller than in the U.S., and not statistically significant in most
cases. Such differences may reflect a higher degree of market segmentation or
smaller scope to achieve further accommodation in Japan.
The second chapter evaluates the efficiency of the FOMC’s new economic
projections. Since 2007, FOMC policymakers have been publishing detailed
numerical projections of macroeconomic series over the next three years. By
testing whether the revisions to these projections are unpredictable, I find that
FOMC’s efficiency is generally accepted for inflation, but often rejected for real
economic variables, notably for the unemployment rate. The rejection is due to
the strong autocorrelation of revisions, which may reflect information rigidity of
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FOMC’s unemployment projections. The joint efficiency of the entire projection
is accepted in most cases.
The third chapter evaluates the efficiency of Fed’s Greenbook forecast and
uses this evaluation to improve the accuracy of the Greenbook forecast. Re-
cently, Patton and Timmermann (2012) proposed a more powerful kind of fore-
cast efficiency regression at multiple horizons, and showed that it provides evi-
dence against the efficiency of the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts. I use their forecast
efficiency evaluation to propose a method for adjusting the Greenbook forecasts.
Using this method in a real-time out-of-sample forecasting exercise, I find that
it gives modest improvements in the accuracy of the forecasts for GDP deflator
and CPI, but not for other variables. The improvements are statistically sig-
nificant in some cases, the magnitude of which can be as high as an 18 percent
reduction in the root mean square prediction error.
Keywords: Unconventional Monetary Policy, Zero Lower Bound,
Identification through Heteroscedasticity, Forecast
Efficiency, Forecast Revisions, Real-Time Data
JEL classification: C32, C53, E43, E44, E52, E58
Primary Reader: Jonathan H. Wright
Secondary Reader: Jon W. Faust
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Monetary Policy
Announcements at the Zero
Lower Bound
1.1 Introduction
The effect of unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB),
which includes forward guidance and asset purchases, has been a centerpiece
of the debate in macro-finance since many advanced economies reached the
ZLB after the financial crisis of 2008. Since the crisis, a number of important
contributions have been made regarding this topic.1 However, the analysis in
the literature primarily focuses on the U.S. economy after the crisis, which is
restricted by a short sample, and researchers are not sure about the effect of
unconventional monetary policy in a different environment.
In this paper, I study the effects of unconventional monetary policy in Japan,
which has experienced a substantially longer period at the ZLB, from 1995
1For example, see D’Amico and King (2013), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011),
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Wright (2012) for the Fed’s Large-Scale
Asset Purchases (LSAPs) programs, and see Joyce, Miles, Scott, and Vayanos (2012) for the
Bank of England’s asset purchases. For more comprehensive review, see Bernanke (2012c).
For the comparison across advanced economies, see Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2014).
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to the present. Specifically, I use the method of identification through het-
eroscedasticity, which was originally proposed by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon
and Sack (2003, 2004) and has been widely used in the recent literature,2 to
estimate the pass-through of monetary policy shock. Identification is based on
the assumption that the variance of monetary policy shocks is particularly high
on important announcement days, whereas nothing unusual happens to other
shocks on these days.
To assess the stimulative effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand, I
focus on the pass-through of monetary policy shock to three financial assets,
which are commonly targeted by central banks: corporate bonds, stocks and
the exchange rate. First, I study the pass-through to corporate bond yields,
because the reduction in the borrowing cost of firms is a key channel through
which monetary policy could stimulate aggregate demand. Second, I analyze
the pass-through to stock prices, which is relevant because the response of stock
prices could increase consumption through the wealth effect. Finally, I evaluate
the pass-through to the exchange rate, through which aggregate demand can be
boosted via the trade balance.
The results show that there is a stark contrast between the pass-through to
corporate bond yields and the pass-through to stock prices and the exchange
rate. For corporate bond yields, there is a statistically significant and about
one-to-one pass-through, notably for high-grade corporate bond yields. This
result is broadly similar to the U.S. estimates in Raskin (2013a). On the other
hand, the pass-through to stock prices and the exchange rate is not statistically
significant in most cases. It contrasts with the results using the U.S. data
2For example, see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013) and Raskin (2013a).
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in Kiley (2013), Neely (2013), and Glick and Leduc (2013), which show the
statistically significant pass-through to these assets.
To interpret the smaller pass-through to stock prices and the exchange rate
in Japan, I discuss two possible explanations. The first explanation is the higher
degree of market segmentation in Japan. In other words, the Japanese financial
market may have some institutional features that lead to inefficient monetary
transmission mechanisms. The second explanation is the smaller scope for the
forward guidance policy to provide effective accommodation. More specifically,
in the economy that has experienced a prolonged period at the ZLB, expecta-
tions about short-term rates are stuck at zero and the intended effect of forward
guidance policy could be substantially limited.
In addition, I use a simple event study to analyze the effects of announce-
ments in 2013, to show that these announcements have substantial effect even on
stock prices. The announcements in 2013 are associated with the regime change
of Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) monetary policy to commit to the 2-percent inflation
target by 2015. Unlike the previous announcements, these announcements had
substantial effects, not only on corporate bonds, but also on stock prices. This
difference may be due to the different nature of the BOJ’s commitment after
2013; the commitment is open-ended and the BOJ announces that it will do
whatever it takes to achieve the target inflation.
Based on the results in this paper and survey measures, I provide a conjec-
ture about the decomposition of the effect of unconventional monetary policy.
Given that survey measures of inflation expectations and short-term interest
rates have been stable, it is likely that unconventional monetary policy affects
the term premium. Furthermore, it is even more likely that unconventional
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monetary policy affects the term premium in the recent regime change; Infla-
tion expectation increases responding to the announcements while the long-term
yields decline, suggesting that we have reduction in the term premium.
Lastly, I provide several robustness checks, to which the main results are
generally robust. First, I analyze the pass-through to other financial assets:
(1) real estate investment trusts (REIT), (2) credit default swaps (CDS), and
(3) the exchange rate of the OECD and Asian economies. Second, I consider
subsamples focusing on different programs: 2001-2006, 2006-2010, and 2010-
2013. Third, I provide the analysis based on the principal component of gov-
ernment bond yields with different maturities. Last, I use alternative sets of
non-announcement days.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the
methodology used in the paper, Section 1.3 explains the data and background
of Japanese monetary policy, Section 1.4 presents the results and discussion.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Method
This section describes an analytical framework to estimate the pass-through of
monetary policy shocks on various financial assets. Based on the standard setup
of two simultaneous equations, I present a simple event study and the framework
of identification through heteroscedasticity. In addition, I introduce the weak-
identification robust confidence set to address the issue of weak identification.
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1.2.1 Setup
Consider the system of two simultaneous equations between the change in the
interest rate and the growth rate of the asset price, ∆it and ∆st. The notation
follows Rigobon and Sack (2004):
∆it = β∆st + γXt + εt, (1.1)
∆st = α∆it + δXt + ηt, (1.2)
where Xt is a common exogenous shock that simultaneously affects both the
interest rate and the asset price, εt is a monetary policy shock, and ηt is a shock
to the asset price.
In this system, I primarily focus on estimating the parameter α because
it indicates how much monetary policy shocks affect asset prices through the
changes in the interest rate. However, the OLS estimate of the pass-through,
α, is biased since both variables, ∆it and ∆st, are simultaneously determined
in the system.3
1.2.2 Event Study
An event study is a simple way to estimate the pass-through using a directly
measured monetary policy surprise. By picking the important announcements
and regarding them as complete surprises, we can use the corresponding changes
in the asset prices to estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks. Gagnon,
Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) directly measured the effect of the Fed’s
Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) by assuming that the announcements about
3For the derivation of the OLS estimate and its bias, see Appendix A.1.
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the LSAP were complete surprises, and added up the changes on the announce-
ment days. Though the event study is based on the strong assumption that
no other material news came within the announcement window, it can provide
useful benchmark results.
1.2.3 Identification through Heteroscedasticity
To obtain a consistent estimate of the pass-through under weaker assumptions,
we employ a scheme called identification through heteroscedasticity, proposed
by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004). Essentially, it uses the
shift of the variances of endogenous variables between the announcement days
and non-announcement days as instruments for the identification.
I introduce some notation and assumptions to describe this scheme of iden-
tification. First, I denote a subset of the policy announcement days as A and
a subset of the non-announcement days as Ā.4 Second, I denote the number
of announcement days and non-announcement days as TA and TĀ, and thus
the total number of days as T ≡ TA + TĀ. Finally, I assume that the vari-
ance of monetary policy shock is larger on the announcement days than on the
non-announcement days, but the variance of other shocks are the same across
these two sets of days. Under this assumption, the difference of the conditional
variance-covariance matrices in these two sets of days, ΩA and ΩĀ, only de-
pends on the variance of monetary policy shocks. Specifically, we can compute
4Unlike Rigobon and Sack (2004), all business days that do not belong to A are treated
as the non-announcement days. To make this point clear, I denote a subset of the non-
announcement days as Ā. The results using alternative sets of the non-announcement days
are presented in Section 1.4.5.4.
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the difference of the variances, ∆Ω, as follows:















are the conditional variances of monetary policy shocks on
the announcement days and the non-announcement days, respectively.5 This
is because the effects of other shocks are cancelled out by taking the difference
between the announcement days and non-announcement days.
As discussed in Rigobon and Sack (2004), α can be estimated by using ∆Ω
as the instruments for identification. To formalize the instruments, we first
define endogenous variables. Let ∆iA and ∆sA be TA × 1 vectors of variables
on the announcement days, and ∆iĀ and ∆sĀ be TĀ × 1 vectors of variables
on the non-announcement days. Then, we can combine these two vectors into
T × 1 vectors of endogenous variables:
∆i ≡ [∆iA, ∆iĀ ]
′
, (1.4)
∆s ≡ [∆sA, ∆sĀ ]
′
. (1.5)
Given these endogenous variables, ∆i and ∆s, instruments are constructed
by normalizing with the number of days in each subset of days, and by flipping





















5For the derivation, see Appendix A.2.
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It is easy to see that zi and zs are relevant and valid instruments to identify
the pass-through in Equation (1.2). First, these instruments are correlated with
the endogenous variables as long as the variances on the announcement days and
non-announcement days are different. On the other hand, these instruments are
uncorrelated with the shocks to the asset prices as presented in Equation (1.3).6
In this paper, I use the orthogonality of both instruments as the moment
conditions for GMM estimation. Though I can estimate the pass-through by
the IV estimation using just one instrument, as implemented in Rigobon and
Sack (2004), the GMM estimation should provide more efficient estimates. The
moment conditions are described as follows:
E[ft(α)] = 0, (1.8)
where
ft(α) = Zt · et,
Zt = [zi,t, zs,t]
′,
et = ∆st − α∆it.
The GMM estimate of α can be obtained by solving the minimum distance
problem:
αGMM = arg min
α
fT (α)
′ W fT (α), (1.9)
where fT (α) =
∑T
t=1 ft(α) and W is an appropriate 2 × 2 weighting matrix.
I use the two-step GMM for the estimation, in which I first use the identity
6For the formal proof of the orthogonality, see Appendix A.3.
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matrix as a weighting matrix to solve the minimization problem, and then use
the inverse of estimated variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions in
the first step as a weighting matrix in the second step. Inference for the GMM
estimation is based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
1.2.4 Weak-Identification Robust Confidence Set
One concern of identification through heteroscedasticity is that the difference
between the announcement days and non-announcement days may not be large
enough for strong identification. In order to address the issue of weak identi-
fication, I employ the two statistic that could derive weak-instrument robust
confidence sets: the S statistic in Stock and Wright (2000), an extension of the
Anderson and Rubin’s (1949) statistic to GMM, and the K statistic in Kleiber-
gen (2005).7 These statistics test the null hypothesis for a hypothesized value of
the parameter, based on the moment conditions evaluated at the hypothesized
value. The confidence set is derived as the set of parameter values for which
the test accepts the null hypothesis.


























which is an estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the mo-
ment conditions. Note that the S statistic is based on the objective function
in the minimization problem in Equation 1.9, but the value is evaluated at the
7For details, see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).
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hypothesized value of the parameter, α0. The S statistic has a chi-square null
limiting distribution, with the number of moment conditions as the degrees of
freedom.






















































































Essentially, the K statistic uses an optimal subset of moment conditions to im-
prove the power of the tests. In other words, by using a subset of more relevant
moment conditions, we could improve the efficiency of the test statistic, which
leads to the higher power of the tests. The only difference between the S statistic
in Equation (1.10) and the K statistic in Equation (1.12) is that the K statistic
uses the variance-covariance matrix adjusted by the projection matrix based on
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D̂T (α). D̂T (α) is a residual of the gradient of moment conditions, qT (α), after
projecting it on the level of the moment conditions, fT (α). By construction,
D̂T (α) is orthogonal to fT (α) and we use this orthogonality to improve the effi-
ciency. The K statistic also has a chi-square null limiting distribution, with the
number of parameters as the degrees of freedom.
1.3 Data and Background
This section describes the data and background to show that there is enough
variation to identify the pass-through of monetary policy shock. After describ-
ing the data, I provide a brief summary of Japanese monetary policy. Then,
I explain the selection of important announcements and provide a statistical
analysis showing that the selection is valid in terms of identification.
1.3.1 Data
I estimate the pass-through of monetary policy shocks to three financial assets:
(1) corporate bond yields, (2) stock prices, and (3) the exchange rate. The
analysis is based on daily data from April 1998 to July 2013, all of which are
obtained from the Bloomberg.
The details of the series are described as follows:
1. Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yield: generic yield with a maturity of
5, 7, 10 and 20 years;
2. Corporate bond yield: the Bloomberg Fair Value (BFV) indices of AA
and BBB corporate bond yields for the industrial sector, with a maturity
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of 5 and 10 years;8
3. Stock prices: Nikkei 225 and TOPIX (stock price index in the Tokyo stock
exchange [TSE]);
4. Exchange rates: spot exchange rates of the U.S. dollar and the euro,
measured by the Japanese yen.
I compute the daily changes in levels for the JGB and corporate bond yields,
and the continuously compounding rate of daily change for stock prices and the
exchange rate. The data between March 11 and March 18, 2011 is excluded
from the analysis to eliminate the effect of the earthquake in March 2011.
1.3.2 Brief Summary of Japanese Monetary Policy
The BOJ’s overnight interest rate has been reduced to nearly zero for approx-
imately two decades, and three different programs of unconventional monetary
policies have been implemented. Table 1.1 summarizes the timeline of the im-
portant events in Japanese monetary policy, and Figure 1.2 shows the volume
of monetary base.9
The first program was called “quantitative easing” (QE) and implemented
from March 2001 to March 2006 under Governors Hayami and Fukui. Under
the QE program, the BOJ set its current account balance as the main policy
target and purchased long-term JGBs to achieve this target.10 The QE program
8The AA index and the BBB index are available from June 8, 1999 and January 30, 2003,
respectively. The BBB index with a maturity of 10 years is not available from February 6,
2012.
9For more comprehensive accounts of BOJ’s monetary policy, see Ito and Mishkin (2006)
and Ueda (2012b).
10For an analysis of the QE program, see Ugai (2007) and Shiratsuka (2010). More recently,
Shibamoto and Tachibana (2013) analyze the effects of the QE program using the method of
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was terminated in March 2006, and the overnight interest rate was gradually
raised to 0.5 percent. However, in response to the global financial crisis in 2008,
the BOJ reduced the overnight interest rate to zero again.
The second program was called “comprehensive monetary easing” (CME)
and implemented from October 2010 to April 2013 under Governor Shirakawa.
Under the CME program, the BOJ purchased not only JGBs, but also com-
mercial paper and risky assets such as ETFs and REITs, while also making a
commitment to keep the policy rate at zero. This is the policy prescription
proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). In addition, the BOJ provided
various forms of lending programs to financial institutions.
Most recently, the BOJ substantially expanded its asset purchase program
and launched it as “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” (QQME).
The QQME program has been implemented since April 2013 under Governor
Kuroda. Under the QQME program, the BOJ commits to achieving 2 percent
inflation by 2015. To achieve this goal, the BOJ announced that it would
increase the monetary base at a pace of 60 to 70 trillion yen per year, and
extend the average maturity of its JGB holdings from three years to seven
years.11
1.3.3 Selection of Monetary Policy Announcements
The selection of the important announcements is crucial for the analysis in this
paper, and I select 41 announcement days from April 1998 to July 2013 based
identification through heteroscedasticity. Kimura and Nakajima (2013) use a special type of
regime-switching structural VAR using the data from 1981 to 2012, with ad hoc shrinkage in
certain parameters.
11For details, see Kuroda (2013).
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on Ueda (2012a). The exact dates and overview are listed on Table 1.2. These
dates are associated with the BOJ’s “official” change in its monetary policy.12
In addition, I include other dates when strong signals concerning future
changes in BOJ’s monetary policy were made. For example, I include the days
when the new BOJ governor was nominated and the confirmation hearing was
held by the National Diet in 2013. On the other hand, I do not include other
meeting days or the days of speeches by the BOJ governor or other board
members. This is because including trivial or indirect news announcement
days will make the distinction between the announcement days and the non-
announcement days unclear, which undermines the identification as discussed
in Wright (2012).
1.3.4 Standard Deviations of the Series
To see whether the actual data is consistent with the assumptions for the iden-
tification, Table 1.3 compares the standard deviations of the daily changes on
the announcement days and non-announcement days. Consistent with the as-
sumptions, the standard deviations are higher on the announcement days than
on the non-announcement days for almost all series, except for the BBB yield
with a maturity of 10 years.
To test whether the variances in these two sets of days are significantly dif-
ferent, I conduct three statistical tests: the F-test, the block bootstrap and the
12I exclude two dates from the list in Ueda (2012a), April 13, 1999 and March 14, 2011.
First, I exclude April 13, 1999 because the commitment to keep the policy rate at zero made
by the BOJ governor is not entirely clear. Ueda (2012a) also notes that the market reacted
to this event very slowly. However, including this date does not materially change the results.
Second, I exclude March 14, 2011 since this is the meeting right after the earthquake.
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stationary bootstrap. All tests are based on the null hypothesis that the popu-
lation variance in these two sets of days are equal. Since the F-test assumes that
each observation is independent, I use the block bootstrap and the stationary
bootstrap to take the heteroscedasticity observed in the daily data into account.
In the block bootstrap, I construct an artificial sample by resampling the block
of 10 days to preserve heteroscedasticity. On the other hand, in the stationary
bootstrap, the length of the block is randomly determined.13 After constructing
an artificial sample, I compute the variance ratio in the artificial sample. By
repeating this exercise, I can form the bootstrap distribution of the variance
ratio and compute the p-values based on the percentile of the sample variance
ratio.
The null hypothesis is rejected for most series, with the sample variance ratio
larger than one, except for the 10-year BBB corporate bond yields. Therefore,
we could conclude that the variance is significantly larger on the announcement
days. The F-test tends to reject the null hypothesis more often than the other
two tests based on the bootstrap.
1.4 Results
In this section, I present GMM estimates showing that the pass-through of
monetary policy shock is one to one for corporate bond yields, but it is smaller
than the U.S. estimates for stock prices and the exchange rate. Then, I dis-
cuss how the segmentation of financial markets and the length of the period
at the ZLB can help reconcile such differences. In addition, I provide an event
13More specifically, an artificial sample is constructed by the Bernoulli trial, either to pick
a random sample or the sample on the next day. I set the probability of the latter as 0.9 to
make the expected length of the block 10 days.
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study showing that the announcements in 2013 have substantial effects on asset
prices. Given these results, I discuss the decomposition of the effect of uncon-
ventional monetary policy. The results of weak-identification robust confidence
set suggest that focusing on the subset of more important announcement will
help identification. Lastly, I present several robustness checks using additional
variables and subperiods to confirm the main results.
1.4.1 Event Study
Table 1.4 presents the results of the event study focusing on the QQME program
in 2013.14 The results show that the announcements of the QQME program
led to a substantial decline in the long-term JGB and corporate bond yields.
Furthermore, stock prices substantially increased on these announcement days,
but the effect on exchange rates was mixed.
The results show that the long-term JGB and corporate bond yields substan-
tially declined responding to the announcements. Specifically, the JGB yields
declined 11.4 (10 years) and 17.7 (20 years) basis points on April 4th, and the
cumulative decline on all announcements was 14.0 (10 years) and 23.3 (20 years)
basis points, respectively. Corporate bond yields also declined on these days,
but the magnitude is smaller than JGB yields. The 10-year AA bond yield de-
clined 9.72 basis points on April 4, and the cumulative decline was 10.65 basis
points.15
14Ueda (2012a) provides an event study of the monetary policy announcements between
1999 and 2011 and shows that the announcements regarding the QE programs lowered the
JGB and corporate bond yields, but did not significantly affect stock prices or exchange rates.
Lam (2011) conducts an event study from 2008 to 2011, which covers the part of the CME
program, and finds similar results.
15The effects for yields with shorter maturities are trivial, primarily because they are all
stuck at the zero lower bound.
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The results also show that stock prices substantially increased on the an-
nouncement days. The cumulative increases of the Nikkei 225 and TOPIX
indices were 5.18 percent and 3.68 percent, respectively. On the other hand,
the effect on exchange rates was mixed. Even though the announcement on
April 4 led to a substantial depreciation of the Japanese yen, 3.49 percent for
the U.S. dollar and 4.16 percent for the euro, this effect was quickly offset on
subsequent announcements.
1.4.2 GMM Estimates of Pass-Through
Table 1.5 presents the pass-through to corporate bond yields, stock prices, and
the exchange rate. The results show that there is a statistically significant
and nearly one-for-one pass-through to corporate bond yields, notably for high-
grade bond yields. On the other hand, the pass-through to stock prices and the
exchange rate is negative but the estimated magnitude is quite small and not
statistically significant in most cases.
I present the estimates of the pass-through to different asset prices based
on an individual JGB yield. This is because monetary policy shocks primarily
influence the overall level of the JGB yields, and the change in JGB yield with
any maturity should reflect such shocks.
1.4.2.1 Corporate Bond Yields
For the AA corporate bond yields, most of the pass-through is statistically
significant, with a magnitude from 0.39 to 1.84. It implies that an expansionary
monetary policy shock, which lowers the 20-year JGB yield by 100 basis points,
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will lower the 5-year AA corporate bond yield 39 basis points, and lower the 10-
year AA corporate bond yield 92 basis points. All estimates are smaller than
one and statistically significant, except for the pass-through from the 5-year
JGB to the 10-year AA bond.
On the other hand, the estimates of the pass-through to the medium-grade
corporate bond yields varies; the estimated magnitude is from -2.90 to 2.50.
The estimates are positive in most cases and some of them are close to one,
which suggests that monetary policy shocks are passed on to BBB corporate
bond yields to some extent. However, no estimate is statistically significant
because of the large standard errors.
1.4.2.2 Stock Prices
The estimates of the pass-through to stock prices are mostly negative, ranging
between -1.32 and -0.13. These estimates imply that an expansionary monetary
policy shock, which lowers JGB yields by 100 basis points, increases stock prices
by 0.13 to 1.32 percent. However, only one of them, the pass-through from the
20-year JGB yield to the TOPIX index is statistically significant. In other
words, the estimated magnitude of the pass-through to stock prices is so small
that the estimates are not significantly different from zero in most cases.
1.4.2.3 Exchange Rates
The results show that the pass-through to the exchange rate is mostly negative,
with the magnitude between -0.77 and 0.09. These estimates imply that an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock, which lowers JGB yields by 100 basis points,
leads a depreciation of the Japanese yen by 0.77 percent, or its appreciation by
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0.09 percent.16 However, only the pass-through from the 20-year JGB yield,
-0.21 for the U.S. dollar and -0.20 for the euro, is statistically significant.
These results are consistent with the prediction of conventional interest rate
parity, which suggests that the expected return on domestic assets should be
the same as the exchange-rate adjusted expected return on foreign assets. In
other words, a decline in the JGB yield should be adjusted by a depreciation
of the Japanese yen, which would boost the stimulative effect of expansionary
monetary policy shocks. However, the estimated magnitude of the pass-through
is quite small and few estimates are statistically significant.
1.4.3 Weak-Identification Robust Confidence Set
As can be seen from the results, the S and the K tests fail to identify the
relevant confidence set in many cases. In other words, the tests accept the null
hypothesis for all parameter values. This lack of identification suggests that the
difference of the variances on the announcement and non-announcement days
is not big enough for identification, even though the difference is statistically
significant in some tests.
To show that focusing on more relevant announcements improves identifi-
cation, Table 1.6 presents the results with 25 selected announcements that are
explicitly related to JGB purchases and the QE programs. In contrast to the
results based on the baseline set of announcements, both the S and K tests iden-
tify the relevant confidence sets in many cases, which suggests that eliminating
less relevant announcements greatly improves identification. The estimates are
16Since I use the exchange rate that measures the value of non-Japanese currency by the
Japanese yen, a rise in the exchange rate implies depreciation of the Japanese yen.
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broadly similar to the results based on the baseline results. The pass-through to
corporate bond yields is statistically significant in most cases and its magnitude
is close to one. Unlike the baseline case, the pass-through to stock prices is
often positive, but its magnitude is small and not statistically significant. The
pass-through to the exchange rate is mostly negative, and some estimates are
statistically significant.
1.4.4 Discussion of the Results
Given these results, I first provide the comparison between Japanese and the
U.S. results. Though Japanese results are consistent with the U.S. results in
their signs, the estimated magnitude of pass-through is considerably smaller for
stock prices and the exchange rate. I discuss that the higher degree of market
segmentation, and the smaller scope to achieve further accommodation using
forward guidance could help explain such differences. Second, I compare the
event study focusing on announcements in 2013 and the GMM estimates using
the entire sample to highlight that the announcements in 2013 had a substantial
effect on asset prices. Then I associate this difference with the regime change
of BOJ’s monetary policy. Lastly, I make a conjecture about the decomposition
of the effect of unconventional monetary policy based on survey measures, to
argue that it primarily affects the term premium.
1.4.4.1 Comparison with the U.S. Estimates
For corporate bond yields, Japanese and U.S. estimates are similar both in
their signs and magnitudes. On the other hand, though both the Japanese and
the U.S. estimates are negative for stock prices and the exchange rate, which
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is consistent with the predictions of economic theories, the magnitude of the
Japanese estimates is substantially smaller than the U.S. estimates.
For corporate bond yields, the pass-through to corporate bond yields is
broadly similar in Japan and in the U.S. Raskin (2013a) finds the one-to-one
pass-through from the U.S. treasury yields to high-grade corporate bond yields
with the ratings above A, based on identification through heteroscedasticity.
Similar to the Japanese case, the pass-through to medium-grade bond yields
with the ratings of BBB and BB is statistically insignificant in most cases.17
For stock prices, the pass-through is negative both in Japan and the U.S.,
but the estimated magnitudes are substantially smaller in Japan. Kiley (2013)
estimates that the responses of the stock prices to monetary policy shocks ranges
between -3.0 and -1.5, by using the sample in the Great Recession.18 Compared
to these estimates, the Japanese estimates, which are marginally negative with
a magnitude of 0.2, are substantially smaller.19
17Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) also note that the LSAP had a negligible
effect on the medium-grade bond yields.These results are puzzling because corporate bond
yields could be regarded as the sum of the risk-free rate and the risk premium for a default. If
an expansionary monetary shock lowers the government bond yields, it should equally affect
the high-grade and medium-grade corporate bond yields. One way to explain the limited
pass-through to the medium-grade bond yields is to introduce the safety premium proposed
by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The safety premium is the premium paid
by investors to satisfy their unique demand for long-term safe assets. Since the medium-grade
corporate bonds are not regarded as safe assets, their yield are not affected by the decline
of the government bond yields. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) argue that the
effect of the Fed’s LSAP announcements is primarily due to reduction in the safety premium.
18Kiley (2013)’s estimates are substantially smaller than the estimates in Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) that use the sample before the Great
Recession. This is because monetary policy shocks identified in the ZLB sample are less
stimulative than in normal times due to the lower bound on short-term yields. In other
words, the effect of monetary policy shocks may be weaker at the ZLB because they can only
influence a part of the yield curve.
19Similar to Japanese case, Rosa (2012) also documents that the effect of Bank of England’s
announcements about gilt purchases is not statistically significant on stock prices.
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For the exchange rate, the magnitude of Japanese estimates, -0.2, is also sub-
stantially smaller than the U.S. estimates, even though the sign of pass-through
is the same in both countries. Neely (2013) estimates that the announcement
of the Fed’s LSAP caused a 3 or 4 percent depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Glick
and Leduc (2013) also report that the pass-through to exchange rates during
the Great Recession is -3.0 by identifying the monetary policy surprises based
on high-frequency data.
To interpret the smaller magnitudes of the pass-through in Japan compared
to the U.S., I propose two possible explanations: First, the Japanese stock
and foreign exchange markets may not be responsive to monetary policy shocks
because of the higher degree of market segmentation. For example, it is com-
mon for Japanese firms to hold each other’s stocks to prevent hostile takeovers.
On the other hand, there are retail investors in the foreign exchange market,
who constitute a considerable portion of the market and tend to hold foreign-
currency dominated assets for a long period.20 Since these investors wouldn’t
change their allocation of assets responding to monetary policy shocks, the re-
actions of asset prices become less pronounced and the overall pass-through
could be smaller. In other words, these institutional factors increase the degree
of segmentation in the stock and foreign exchange markets, which may lead to
inefficient monetary transmission mechanisms.
Second, the scope to provide further accommodation using forward guidance
may be smaller in Japan, because the timing of any expected liftoff is far away.
Since the Japanese economy has been stuck at the ZLB for nearly two decades,
it is very hard for any announcement to change expectations about future short
20For details, see Zurawski and D’Arcy (2009).
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rates. As can be seen in Figure 1.3, the JGB yield curve has shifted downward
over time, and even the 5-year JGB yield is virtually zero after 2010. As Swanson
and Williams (forthcoming) pointed out, asset prices are affected by the entire
path of expected future short-term interest rates, not only the current level of
interest rate. However, this extremely low level of the long-term JGB yields
suggest that the expected lift off of short-term interest rate from zero is far
away, which makes the effect of forward guidance policy quite limited. As a
result, the announcements cannot affect the asset prices and the pass-through
of monetary policy shocks becomes smaller.
1.4.4.2 Comparison of Announcements Before and After 2013
The comparison of the event study and GMM show that the announcements
in 2013 had substantial effects, not only on corporate bonds, but also on stock
prices. It may be because the announcements in 2013 were associated with the
BOJ’s regime change, in which the BOJ made an open-ended commitment to
achieve the inflation target, creating a huge surprise.
Romer (2013) describes this policy change in 2013 as “an honest-to-goodness
regime shift” and “(the BOJ) took dramatic actions and pledged convincingly
to do whatever it takes to end deflation.” Consistent with her argument, some
survey measures show that inflation expectations have substantially increased
in 2013. For example, Figure 1.4 shows the upward shift of the inflation ex-
pectation in the mean of the ESP Forecast (survey of professional forecasters in
Japan) in 2013, which could be up to 0.8 percent. Hausman and Wieland (2014)
also provide similar analysis and conclude that the set of policy package called
“Abenomics,” which includes the introduction of the QQME program in 2013,
23
raised long-run inflation expectation.21 However, even though the announce-
ments in 2013 have substantial effects, the GMM estimates are not statistically
significant since they average the effect over the full sample.
1.4.4.3 Decomposition into Different Component and Individual Pol-
icy
Lastly, I provide the discussion of the decomposition of the effects of uncon-
ventional monetary policy. I discuss two types of decompositions; the first is
to analyze which component of long-term interest rate is affected by uncon-
ventional monetary policy, and the second is to analyze the effects of different
policies, either forward guidance or asset purchases.
For the first decomposition, I make a conjecture that unconventional mone-
tary policy primarily affects the term premium, based on the survey measures.
As summarized in Bernanke (2013), the long-term interest rate can be decom-
posed into three components (the expected path of inflation, the expected path
of the real interest rate, and the term premium), and a growing body of research
claims that the Fed’s LSAP primarily affects the term premium.
In Japan, it seems likely that the QE programs had primarily influenced the
term premium, because survey measures of inflation expectations had been quite
stable until recently, and so had survey measures of short-term interest rates.
Furthermore, considering that the long-term yields declined after the introduc-
tion of QQME program, despite the increase in the inflation expectations, it is
even more likely that these announcements reduced the term premium. How-
ever, it is hard to quantify the exact effects due to the lack of a credible measure
21On the other hand, Fujiwara, Nakazono, and Ueda (2014) note that there is no significant
increase in inflation expectation at 10-year horizon after the introduction of the QQME.
24
of inflation expectations in Japan.22
For the second decomposition, this analysis only provides the estimates of the
average effects of unconventional policies, and estimates cannot be interpreted
as the effect of individual policies, forward guidance or asset purchases. In the
recent literature, the channels through which QE programs have an impact on
financial markets become very topical.23 I provide the analysis of subsample to
shed some light on this issue, but it is difficult to tackle this decomposition due
to the simultaneity of the announcements and lack of high-frequency data, and
I will leave it as a future research question.
1.4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, I provide several robustness checks, to which the main results
are generally robust. First, I analyze the pass-through to other financial as-
sets. Second, I consider subsamples focusing on different programs. Third, I
provide the analysis based on the principal component of JGB yields. Last, I
use alternative sets of non-announcement days.
1.4.5.1 Additional Variables
I extend the analysis using three kinds of additional variables: (1) REITs, (2)
CDS index, and (3) exchange rates in other OECD and Asian economies.24
22For example, the Japanese break-even inflation rate is not reliable as a measure of inflation
expectation since its market is too small and the issuance of the new inflation-index linked
bonds has been suspended since October 2008.
23For example, Woodford (2012) points out that distinguishing the effect of the central
bank’s economic outlook and the effect of policy announcements is crucial. Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) claim that evaluation of the channels of an unconventional
monetary policy is necessary when considering the exit strategy. Some papers such as Raskin
(2013b) explicitly analyze the effect of forward guidance policy.
24The REIT index is available from April 2003.
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These variables are of interest for slightly different reasons. First, REITs are
of interest because the BOJ purchased them in the QE programs. Second, the
analysis of the CDS index will shed some light on the effects of the QE programs
on credit default risk as discussed in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013). Lastly, I
focus on exchange rates relative to these countries because the so-called “yen-
carry trade,” in which investors borrow money in the Japanese yen and invest
in high-interest rate currencies, has been prominent since the late 1990s. These
high-yield currencies include the Australian and New Zealand dollars and other
emerging Asian currencies.25
Table 1.7 presents the standard deviations and variance ratios of these vari-
ables. Consistent with the assumptions of the identification, the standard devia-
tions are higher on the announcement days than on the non-announcement days
for all series. In addition, most of these differences are statistically significant.
Table 1.8 shows the GMM estimates of the pass-through to the REITs, the
CDS index, and exchange rates using the baseline announcement days, and
Table 1.9 shows the GMM estimates using the selected announcement days.
For the REITs, the pass-through is mostly negative and some of them are sta-
tistically significant. The negative pass-through implies that an expansionary
monetary policy shock lead to the increase in the price of these financial as-
sets. The magnitude of the pass-through to the REITs is between -0.46 and
-0.16. The pass-through to the CDS index is positive, but the magnitude varies
substantially with the maturity of the JGB yields and none are statistically sig-
nificant. The pass-through to exchange rates in the OECD and Asian economies
is negative in almost all cases, with a magnitude between -0.14 and -0.22. The
25For details, see Hattori and Shin (2008).
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estimates are similar to the estimates for the U.S. dollar and the euro, which
suggests that the expansionary monetary policy shocks lead a depreciation of
the Japanese yen relative to all other currencies. However, the magnitude of
the depreciation is quite small.
1.4.5.2 Analysis of Subsamples
To analyze how different QE programs affect corporate bond yields and asset
prices, I conduct the same analysis in three subsamples focusing on the different
QE programs: (1) the QE program (2001-2006), (2) the period between the QE
and the CME programs (2006-2010), and (3) the CME program (2010-2013).
The results are presented in Table 1.10. The period before the QE program
(1998-2001) and the QQME program (2013-) are excluded since the number of
announcements are too small.
The findings are broadly similar to the main results. The QE programs have
statistically significant pass-through to corporate bond yields, mostly one-to-
one, but the pass-through to the stock prices or exchange rates is not statistically
significant. For the high-grade corporate bond yields, pass-through is mostly
one-to-one with a magnitude between 0.36 and 1.87. Unlike the main results,
the pass-through to the medium-grade bond yields is statistically significant in
some cases, with the magnitude between 0.44 and 1.98. Such a wide range of
estimates may reflect their volatility due to small samples in the subperiods.
The signs of pass-through to stock prices are mixed but none are statistically
significant. The pass-through to exchange rates is negative in most cases, but
only a few estimates are statistically significant.
Furthermore, there is no obvious difference in the pass-through in different
27
subperiods, which suggests that the effects of different QE programs are broadly
similar over time. One evident difference is that the pass-through from the 5-
year JGB yield is not statistically significant during the CME program between
2010 and 2013. But this is because the 5-year JGB yield is extremely low in
this period.
1.4.5.3 Analysis Using the Principal Component of JGB Yields
To jointly analyze the pass-through from the JGB yields with different matu-
rities, I conduct the same analysis using a principal component of these JGB
yields. Table 1.11 presents the results for main and additional variables. The
results are broadly similar to the main results. The pass-through to the high-
grade corporate bond yields is positive and statistically significant, whereas the
pass-through to the stock prices and exchange rates is negative but not statis-
tically significant in most cases.
1.4.5.4 Alternative Set of Non-Announcement Days
I use two alternative definitions of non-announcement days to estimate the pass-
through of monetary policy shock. First, following Rigobon and Sack (2004), a
non-announcement day is defined as one business day prior to the announcement
day. Accordingly, the number of announcement days and non-announcement
days are the same. Second, following Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013), I exclude
all the BOJ meeting days from the set of non-announcement days because some
trivial or indirect news released on these meeting days may contaminate the
identification. The estimates using these alternative definitions are not listed




This paper analyzes the effects of unconventional monetary policy in Japan,
which has been stuck at the ZLB for a substantially longer period than any other
economy. To discuss if we could learn any lessons from Japanese experience,
this paper compares the estimates of the pass-through of monetary policy shocks
with the U.S. estimates.
By using the tools of an event study and identification through heteroscedas-
ticity, I find that the effects of expansionary monetary policy shocks are directly
passed on to corporate bond yields, notably for high-grade bond yields. How-
ever, the pass-through to stock prices and the exchange rate is not statistically
significant in most cases. These results contrast with the U.S. results, where
the pass-through to all assets is statistically significant. Such differences may
reflect the segmentation of Japanese financial markets, or the limited scope for
the forward guidance policy to be effective in Japan, due to the prolonged period
at the ZLB.
The comparison between Japan and the U.S. suggests two important im-
plications for policymakers: First, unconventional monetary policy is effective
even in an extreme environment where the economy is stuck at the ZLB for
nearly two decades. Second, however, its effect could be substantially limited
if the financial market is segmented, or the economy is stuck at the ZLB for a
prolonged period.
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Figure 1.1: BOJ’s overnight policy rate and Fed’s federal fund rate from 1985
to the present
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Figure 1.2: Monetary Base from 1985 to the present
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Figure 1.3: JGB Yield Curve from 1998 to 2013 (Selected Dates)
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Figure 1.4: ESP Inflation Forecast in 2013 (Target Periods of 2013–2015)
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Date Event Policy Rate(%) Governer
4/14/1995 1.0 Matsushita
9/8/1995 0.5





3/19/2001 Quantitative Easing (QE)
launched
0




12/19/2008 JGB purchase increased 0
10/5/2010 Comprehensive Monetary Easing
(CME) launched
0
4/4/2013 CME terminated, and Quanti-
tative and Qualitative Monetary
Easing (QQME) launched
0 Kuroda
Table 1.1: Timeline of BOJ’s Monetary Policy
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Date Event Summary
9/9/1998 BOJ Statement Policy rate reduced to 0.25 percent
2/12/1999 BOJ Statement Policy rate reduced close to zero
8/11/2000 BOJ Statement Policy rate raised to 0.25 percent
3/19/2001
∗
BOJ Statement Quantitative easing (QE) launched (policy rate close to zero)
8/14/2001 ∗ BOJ Statement QE expanded
12/19/2001
∗
BOJ Statement QE expanded
2/28/2002
∗
BOJ Statement JGB purchase increased
9/18/2002∗ BOJ Statement Stock purchase announced
10/30/2002
∗
BOJ Statement QE expanded
3/25/2003∗ BOJ Statement Stock purchase expanded
4/8/2003∗ BOJ Statement ABS purchase announced
4/30/2003
∗
BOJ Statement QE expanded
5/20/2003 ∗ BOJ Statement QE expanded
10/10/2003
∗
BOJ Statement QE expanded
1/20/2004
∗
BOJ Statement QE expanded
3/9/2006
∗
BOJ Statement QE terminated
7/14/2006 BOJ Statement Policy rate raised to 0.25 percent
2/21/2007 BOJ Statement Policy rate raised to 0.5 percent
9/18/2008∗ BOJ Statement Dollar swap
10/31/2008 BOJ Statement Policy rate reduced to 0.3 percent
12/2/2008∗ BOJ Statement Facilitation of corporate finance
12/19/2008
∗
BOJ Statement JGB purchase increased (policy rate reduced close to zero)
2/3/2009∗ BOJ Statement Stock purchase restarted
3/18/2009
∗
BOJ Statement JGB purchase increased
12/1/2009∗ BOJ Statement Fixed-rate 3-month operation
12/18/2009∗ BOJ Statement “Inflation target” clarified
3/17/2010∗ BOJ Statement Fixed-rate operation expanded
5/21/2010∗ BOJ Statement Growth enhancing operation
8/30/2010∗ BOJ Statement Fixed-rate 6-month operation
10/5/2010
∗
BOJ Statement Comprehensive monetary easing (CME) launched
8/4/2011 BOJ Statement CME expanded
10/27/2011 BOJ Statement CME expanded
2/14/2012 BOJ Statement CME expanded
4/10/2012 BOJ Statement CME expanded
4/27/2012 BOJ Statement CME expanded
10/30/2012 BOJ Statement CME expanded and the joint statement with the government issued
12/20/2012 BOJ Statement CME expanded
1/22/2013 BOJ Statement CME expanded and inflation target clarified
2/25/2013 Nomination of the new governor
3/4/2013 Confirmation hearing from the new governor at the National Diet
4/4/2013 BOJ Statement Quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQME) launched
a.Dates with superscript are listed in Table 2 of Ueda (2012a). The announcement days that are
directly related to the JGB purchase and the QE programs are written in italics.
Table 1.2: Dates of BOJ’s Monetary Policy Announcements
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Series Announcement Non-Announcement Variance Ratio
JGB
5 year 3.04 2.89 1.11
7 year 4.47 3.61 1.53∗∗†
10 year 4.30 3.33 1.67∗∗†
20 year 4.94 3.60 1.88∗∗†
Corporate Bond Yield
AA, 5 year 2.95 2.70 1.19
AA, 10 year 3.88 2.90 1.79∗∗‡
BBB, 5 year 2.80 2.78 1.01
BBB, 10 year 3.01 3.12 0.93
Stock Prices
Nikkei 225 1.98 1.55 1.64∗∗†
TOPIX 1.65 1.40 1.39∗
Exchange Rates
US Dollar 1.07 0.71 2.27∗∗‡
Euro 1.26 0.85 2.20∗∗‡
a.This table compares the standard deviation of daily changes on the announcement days
and non-announcement days. Daily changes of the yield in basis points and daily percent
changes of the stock prices and exchange rates are used.
b. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗ denote the significance at the level of 10% and 5%, respectively, based
on the F-test.
c. Subscripts †, ‡ denote the significance at the level of 10% and 5%, respectively, based on
the bootstrap with 10,000 replications. The block bootstrap and the stationary bootstrap
lead exactly the same results.
Table 1.3: Standard Deviations and Variance Ratio on the Announcement Days
and the Non-Announcement Days
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Date Event




5 Year 7 Year 10 Year 20 Year 5 Year 10 Year 5 Year 225 Dollar
2/25/2013 Nomination -1.30 -2.00 -2.20 -2.00 -1.37 -1.71 -0.73 2.40 1.77 -1.73 -2.71
3/4/2013 Confirmation Hearing -1.90 -2.30 -4.40 -7.30 -0.69 0.88 -0.96 0.30 0.11 0.79 1.87
4/4/2013 BOJ Statement -1.20 -5.50 -11.40 -17.70 -2.08 -9.72 -1.65 2.18 2.67 3.49 4.16
4/26/2013 BOJ Statement 1.50 1.40 0.80 -0.70 3.02 -0.71 1.83 -0.30 -0.99 -1.23 -1.10
5/22/2013 BOJ Statement -1.20 0.50 1.20 1.70 -1.04 1.27 -1.02 1.59 0.44 0.64 0.26
6/11/2013 BOJ Statement 4.20 6.30 4.70 4.50 5.39 5.57 5.19 -1.47 -0.98 -2.80 -2.39
7/11/2013 BOJ Statement -0.80 -3.80 -2.70 -1.80 -3.94 -2.61 -2.06 0.39 -0.04 -0.72 0.20
Baseline Events -4.40 -9.80 -18.00 -27.00 -4.14 -14.17 -3.76 4.97 5.24 1.64 1.37
Cumulative -0.70 -5.40 -14.00 -23.30 -0.71 -10.65 0.18 5.18 3.68 -2.47 -1.65
a.This table shows the daily changes of the yields and the daily percent changes of stock prices and exchange rates on the days listed above.
b.Baseline events are listed in Table 1.2 and written in Italic.
Table 1.4: Effects of the QQME Announcements on JGB, Corporate Bond Yields, Stock Prices and Exchange Rates
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel A: Pass-Through from 5-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.97∗∗ (0.29) [ 0.91, 1.12]
AA, 10 year 1.84∗∗ (0.74)
BBB, 5 year 1.19 (2.10)
BBB, 10 year 0.65 (0.58)
Nikkei 225 -1.32 (1.82) [ 0.04, 0.92]
TOPIX -0.81 (0.99) [-0.02, 1.09]
US Dollar -0.77 (1.80)
Euro 0.09 (0.47)
Panel B: Pass-Through from 7-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.84∗∗ (0.41) [ 0.14, 0.59]
AA, 10 year 0.93∗∗ (0.19)
BBB, 5 year 0.36 (1.40)
BBB, 10 year 2.50 (14.31)
Nikkei 225 -0.39 (0.40) [0.07, 0.78]
TOPIX -0.31 (0.30) [0.02, 1.12]
US Dollar -0.09 (0.14)
Euro -0.02 (0.12)
Panel C: Pass-Through from 10-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.41∗∗ (0.19)
AA, 10 year 0.94∗∗ (0.05) [ 0.87, 0.91]
BBB, 5 year -0.12 (0.45)
BBB, 10 year 1.09 (1.24)
Nikkei 225 -0.21 (0.19)
TOPIX -0.19 (0.18)
US Dollar -0.21 (0.19)
Euro -0.13 (0.17)
Panel D: Pass-Through from 20-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.39∗ (0.23) [ 0.13, 0.94]
AA, 10 year 0.84∗∗ (0.21) [0.65, 0.90] [ 0.68, 0.88]
BBB, 5 year 0.21 (0.15)
BBB, 10 year -2.90 (14.96)
Nikkei 225 -0.13 (0.08)
TOPIX -0.15∗ (0.09)
US Dollar -0.21∗∗ (0.10)
Euro -0.20∗ (0.11)
a. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗ denote the significance at the level of 10% and 5%, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in the parenthesis.
b.The 90-percent confidence interval is shown based on S and K statistics. The blank
space implies that a confidence interval is (−∞,∞).
Table 1.5: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Corporate Bond Yield,
Stock Prices and Exchange Rates
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel A: Pass-Through from 5-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 1.01∗∗ (0.05) [ 0.90, 1.19]
AA, 10 year 0.71∗∗ (0.13) [ 0.45, 0.90] [ 0.52, 0.86]
BBB, 5 year 1.14∗∗ (0.09) [ 1.01, 1.36] [-0.42, 1.29]⋆
BBB, 10 year 0.67∗∗ (0.10) [ 0.49, 0.97] [ 0.53, 0.87]
Nikkei 225 0.29∗∗ (0.11) [ 0.11, 0.76] [-1.56, 0.56]⋆
TOPIX 0.28∗∗ (0.09) [ 0.14, 0.70] [-1.33, 0.51]⋆
US Dollar -0.05 (0.07) [-0.17, 0.04] [-0.16, 0.04]
Euro -0.05 (0.11) [-0.24, 0.13] [-0.20, 0.10]
Panel B: Pass-Through from 7-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 1.07∗∗ (0.12) [ 1.15, 1.44] [ 0.17, 1.88]⋆
AA, 10 year 0.45∗∗ (0.09) [ 0.24, 0.61] [ 0.30, 2.00]⋆
BBB, 5 year 1.00∗∗ (0.15) [ 0.80, 1.44] [-0.05, 1.30]⋆
BBB, 10 year 0.42∗∗ (0.09) [ 0.22, 0.64] [ 0.27, 2.10]⋆
Nikkei 225 0.29 (0.23) [-0.74, 2.37] [-0.98, -0.25]
TOPIX 0.27 (0.18) [-0.44, 2.31] [-0.70, 0.97]⋆
US Dollar -0.13 (0.20) [-0.23, 0.17]
Euro -0.15 (0.26) [-0.29, 0.24]
Panel C: Pass-Through from 10-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 1.39∗ (0.40) [ 1.11, 2.06] [ 0.18, 1.87]⋆
AA, 10 year 4.28 (7.60) [ 0.75, 0.81]
BBB, 5 year 0.50∗∗ (0.17) [ 0.88, 1.72] [ 0.02, 1.66]⋆
BBB, 10 year 0.31 (1.32)
Nikkei 225 -0.10 (0.41) [-1.41, 3.68]⋆
TOPIX -0.05 (0.29) [-0.66, 2.03]⋆
US Dollar -0.63 (0.53) [-0.22, 0.42]
Euro -0.99 (1.65)
Panel D: Pass-Through from 20-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.86 (0.53) [ 1.22, 3.07] [ 0.12, 2.63]⋆
AA, 10 year 1.00∗ (0.55) [ 0.51, 0.63]
BBB, 5 year 0.70 (0.45) [ 1.22, 3.67] [ 0.06, 3.13]⋆
BBB, 10 year 0.14 (0.49) [ 1.19, 1.44]
Nikkei 225 -0.16 (0.13)
TOPIX -0.13 (0.11)
US Dollar -0.30∗ (0.16)
Euro -0.27∗∗ (0.12)
a.This table shows the pass-through to the corporate bond yields, stock prices, and
exchange rates. The analysis is based on the selected announcements.
b.Superscript ⋆ indicates that the confidence interval is formed by disjoint confidence
sets.
c.Other notes are the same as in Table 1.5.
Table 1.6: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Corporate Bond Yields,
Stock Prices and Exchange Rates (Selected Announcements)
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Series Announcement Non-Announcement Variance Ratio
Financial Assets
REIT index 1.65 1.52 1.18
CDS index 10.21 6.16 2.75∗∗‡
Exchange Rates: OECD Countries
Australian Dollar 1.26 1.13 1.26
Canadian Dollar 1.23 0.94 1.69∗∗†
Korean Won 1.35 1.08 1.58∗∗
New Zealand Dollar 1.30 1.10 1.38∗
UK Pound 1.21 0.85 2.05∗∗†
Exchange Rates: Asian Economies
Hong Kong Dollar 1.08 0.71 2.32∗∗‡
Singapore Dollar 0.91 0.69 1.74∗∗†
Taiwanese Dollar 1.02 0.75 1.87∗∗‡
Thai Baht 0.99 0.80 1.52∗∗
a.This table compares the standard deviation of daily changes on the announcement
days and non-announcement days for additional variables: REITs, CDS, and the
OECD and Asian exchange rates. Daily changes of the yield in basis points and daily
percent changes of the exchange rates are used.
b.Other notes are the same as in Table 1.3.
Table 1.7: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio of the Series on the An-
nouncement Day and the Non-Announcement Day
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel A: Pass-Through from 5-Year JGB
REIT Index -0.37 (0.27) [-0.89, -0.40]
CDS Index 7.57 (7.23) [ 0.08, 2.26] [ 2.77, 63.55]
Australian Dollar 0.17 (0.77)
Canadian Dollar -1.14 (2.06)
Korean Won -0.94 (1.53)
New Zealand Dollar -0.45 (1.20)
UK Pound 0.01 (0.45)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.93 (2.07)
Singapore Dollar -0.06 (0.26)
Taiwanese Dollar 0.02 (0.30)
Thai Baht -0.11 (0.43) [-0.24, -0.03]
Panel B: Pass-Through from 7-Year JGB
REIT Index 0.23 (0.21) [ 0.17, 0.77] [ 0.17, 0.74]
CDS Index 5.82 (4.29)
Australian Dollar -0.07 (0.13)
Canadian Dollar -0.18 (0.23)
Korean Won -0.28 (0.30)
New Zealand Dollar -0.13 (0.19)
UK Pound -0.03 (0.14)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.11 (0.15)
Singapore Dollar -0.05 (0.11)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.04 (0.10)
Thai Baht -0.04 (0.12)
Table 1.8: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Additional Variables
41
Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel C: Pass-Through from 10-Year JGB
REIT Index -0.34∗ (0.19) [-1.72, -0.35] [-0.71, -0.35]
CDS Index 2.15 (1.94)
Australian Dollar -0.16 (0.15)
Canadian Dollar -0.26 (0.21)
Korean Won -0.19 (0.18)
New Zealand Dollar -0.22 (0.20)
UK Pound -0.16 (0.19)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.23 (0.19)
Singapore Dollar -0.16 (0.14)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.11 (0.13)
Thai Baht -0.16 (0.16)
Panel D: Pass-Through from 20-Year JGB
REIT Index -0.29∗∗ (0.12) [-0.52, 0.27]
CDS Index 0.29 (0.41)
Australian Dollar -0.14∗ (0.08)
Canadian Dollar -0.22∗∗ (0.11)
Korean Won -0.19∗∗ (0.11)
New Zealand Dollar -0.18∗∗ (0.09)
UK Pound -0.21∗ (0.12)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.21∗∗ (0.10)
Singapore Dollar -0.16∗∗ (0.07)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.15∗ (0.08)
Thai Baht -0.16∗∗ (0.08)
a.This table shows the pass-through to additional variables: REITs, CDS, and the OECD
and Asian exchange rates.
b.Other notes are the same as in Table 1.5.
Table 1.8: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Additional Variables
(continued)
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel A: Pass-Through from 5-Year JGB
REIT Index 0.32∗ (0.10) [ 0.17, 0.53] [-1.57, 0.48]⋆
CDS Index -0.93 (0.58) [-2.23, 0.21] [-1.86, -0.05]
Australian Dollar -0.03 (0.07) [-0.31, 0.19] [-0.18, 0.10]
Canadian Dollar -0.03 (0.08) [-0.22, 0.18] [ 0.10, 1.18]
Korean Won 0.02 (0.06) [-0.14, 0.27] [-0.08, 0.16]
New Zealand Dollar 0.01 (0.08) [-0.18, 0.35] [-0.12, 0.18]
UK Pound -0.07 (0.11) [-0.42, 0.05] [-0.27, 0.03]
Hong Kong Dollar -0.03 (0.07) [-0.13, 0.08] [-0.27, 0.03]
Singapore Dollar -0.06 (0.08) [-0.20, 0.04] [-0.13, 0.08]
Taiwanese Dollar -0.05 (0.07) [-0.19, 0.04] [-0.17, 0.03]
Thai Baht -0.05 (0.07) [-0.26, 0.05] [-0.16, 0.03]
Panel B: Pass-Through from 7-Year JGB
REIT Index 0.32∗∗ (0.09) [ 0.21, 0.54] [-0.70, 0.49]⋆
CDS Index -1.40 (1.02) [-4.02, 0.04] [-2.98, -0.20]
Australian Dollar 0.07 (0.20)
Canadian Dollar -0.00 (0.14)
Korean Won 0.17 (0.18)
New Zealand Dollar 0.06 (0.19)
UK Pound -0.09 (0.21)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.12 (0.18) [-0.20, 0.21]
Singapore Dollar -0.12 (0.18) [-0.24, 0.18]
Taiwanese Dollar -0.10 (0.18) [-0.24, 0.21]
Thai Baht -0.09 (0.18)
Table 1.9: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Additional Variables (Selected
Announcements)
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel C: Pass-Through from 10-Year JGB
REIT Index -0.07 (0.21) [0.15, 1.57] [-0.51, 1.27]⋆
CDS Index 1.07 (1.22)
Australian Dollar -0.22 (0.45)
Canadian Dollar -0.29 (0.27)
Korean Won 0.08 (0.45)
New Zealand Dollar -0.25 (0.36)
UK Pound -0.47 (0.36)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.54 (0.41) [-0.19, 0.34]
Singapore Dollar -0.63 (0.66)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.63 (0.69)
Thai Baht -0.45 (0.34)
Panel D: Pass-Through from 20-Year JGB
REIT Index -0.20∗∗ (0.09) [0.00, 1.49] [-0.38, 1.24]⋆
Australian Dollar -0.14 (0.09)
CDS Index 0.32∗∗ (0.09)
Canadian Dollar -0.19∗∗ (0.07)
Korean Won -0.09 (0.12) [-0.25, -0.05]
New Zealand Dollar -0.18∗∗ (0.08)
UK Pound -0.24∗∗ (0.07)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.30∗∗ (0.15)
Singapore Dollar -0.25∗∗ (0.12)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.25∗∗ (0.13)
Thai Baht -0.25∗∗ (0.10)
a.This table shows the pass-through to additional variables: REIT, CDS, and the OECD
and Asian exchange rates. The analysis is based on the selected announcements.
b.Other notes are the same as in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Table 1.9: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through to Additional Variables (Selected
Announcements) (continued)
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2001-2006 (QE) 2006-2010 2010-2013 (CME)
Panel A: Pass-Through from 5-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 1.02∗∗ 1.10∗∗ 1.13
AA, 10 year 1.07∗∗ 0.95∗∗ 3.64
BBB, 5 year 1.04∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 1.58
BBB, 10 year 0.79∗∗ 1.08∗∗ 3.09
Nikkei 225 -0.66 -0.34 0.71
TOPIX -0.53 -0.28 0.64
US Dollar -0.04 -0.06 -0.04
Euro 0.00 -0.07 0.05
Panel B: Pass-Through from 7-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.76∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.55∗∗
AA, 10 year 0.96∗∗ 0.55 1.28∗∗
BBB, 5 year 1.01∗∗ 0.44∗ 0.87∗∗
BBB, 10 year 0.49∗∗ 1.21 1.86∗∗
Nikkei 225 -0.07 -0.94 0.31
TOPIX -0.06 -0.62 0.32
US Dollar -0.02∗∗ -0.08 0.01
Euro 0.05 -0.24 0.06
Panel C: Pass-Through from 10-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.73∗∗ 1.45 0.79∗∗
AA, 10 year 0.98∗∗ 0.99∗∗ 1.80∗∗
BBB, 5 year 1.09∗∗ 1.68 1.13∗∗
BBB, 10 year 0.60∗ 0.84 1.98∗∗
Nikkei 225 -0.05 1.61 0.48
TOPIX -0.04 0.82 0.46
US Dollar -0.03∗∗ -0.21 -0.03
Euro 0.05 -0.33 0.12
Panel D: Pass-Through from 20-Year JGB
AA, 5 year 0.55∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.36∗∗
AA, 10 year 0.97∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.75∗∗
BBB, 5 year 1.19∗∗ 1.07∗∗ 0.52∗∗
BBB, 10 year 0.44∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 1.08∗∗
Nikkei 225 -0.06 0.79 0.11
TOPIX -0.06 0.39 0.09
US Dollar -0.02 -0.18 0.04
Euro 0.05 -0.20 -0.02
Number of Announcements 13 13 9
a.This table shows the pass-through to the corporate bond yields, stock prices, and
exchange rates in the subsamples: 2001-2006 (the QE program), 2006-2010, and
2010-2013 (the CME program).
b.Other notes are the same as in Table 1.5.
Table 1.10: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through in Subperiods
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Estimate Std. Error S Conf. K Conf.
Panel A: Pass-Through to Main Variables
AA, 5 year 0.42∗∗ (0.16) [0.32, 0.50] [0.32, 0.45]
AA, 10 year 0.58∗∗ (0.17)
BBB, 5 year -0.09 (0.50)
BBB, 10 year 0.75 (0.85)
Nikkei 225 -0.15 (0.23)
TOPIX -0.12 (0.18)
US Dollar -0.04 (0.07)
Euro 0.00 (0.05)
Panel B: Pass-Through to Additional Variables
REIT Index 0.13 (0.19) [0.03, 0.96] [0.05, 0.58]
CDS Index 6.04 (8.00)
Australian Dollar -0.04 (0.07)
Canadian Dollar -0.10 (0.15)
Korean Won -0.15 (0.22) [0.00, 0.49]
New Zealand Dollar -0.06 (0.11)
UK Pound -0.01 (0.06)
Hong Kong Dollar -0.05 (0.09)
Singapore Dollar -0.03 (0.05)
Taiwanese Dollar -0.01 (0.04)
Thai Baht -0.03 (0.05)
a.This table presents the pass-through based on the principal component of JGB yields
with a maturity of 5,7,10 and 20 years.
b.Other notes are the same as in Table 1.5.
Table 1.11: GMM Estimates of the Pass-through based on the Principal Com-
ponent of JGB Yields
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Chapter 2




Since October 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has been
publishing the “Summary of Economic Projections” after the meetings. These
economic projections are numerical projections of four macroeconomic series
submitted by individual FOMC policymakers. With a few years of these new
projections in hand, researchers can now begin to assess their efficiency.
The assessment of FOMC’s new economic projections is important for two
reasons. First, given the findings that subjective forecasts are often more ac-
curate than forecasts using reduced-form models,1 analyzing the efficiency of
another subjective forecast is a subject of interest. In particular, these projec-
tions are based on profound knowledge and judgment about economics since
the FOMC has made considerable efforts to make them more accurate and con-
sistent with economic narratives. Second, the assessment of the FOMC’s new
1For details, see Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) and Faust and Wright (2009).
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projections is important in practice because monetary policy decisions are now
explicitly tied to these projections and the public is keenly aware of them.2
In this paper, I evaluate the efficiency of FOMC’s new projections by test-
ing if their revisions are unpredictable. Even though the efficiency could be
evaluated by testing the unpredictability of forecast errors, the power of the
tests would be very low due to the short sample in hand. Therefore, I focus
on the unpredictability of forecast revisions. I propose different tests based on
the time-series property of forecast revisions (bias, autocorrelation, and Wald
statistic) and signs of forecast revisions (positive revisions and consecutive re-
visions). In addition, I propose the joint tests across different target years and
series to improve the power of the tests.
One limitation of this analysis is that the period in which these projections
have been made (2007—2014) is very short, and contains an extremely turbulent
period for the US economy. Forecasting a macroeconomic series is difficult
even during the normal times, and evaluating the efficiency by looking at this
particularly unusual period may not be appropriate. However, an evaluation
in this early stage can still be a useful benchmark, considering close attention
paid to the new projections. To evaluate the size and power of the tests in the
small sample, I provide a Monte Carlo exercise. The simulation results show
that the size is generally close to the nominal size (though the joint tests tend
to be slightly oversized), and some tests are powerful even with a small sample,
against a reasonable set of simulations where the forecasts are not efficient.
The results show a stark contrast between the forecast efficiency of real
2For example, in December 2012, Bernanke (2012a) explains that the FOMC’s decision to
use their unemployment projections to give guidance on how long they will keep the federal
fund rate low is to “make FOMC’s intention to maintain accommodation more explicit.”
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economic projections and inflation projections. While the efficiency is accepted
for inflation in almost all years, it is often rejected for real economic variables,
notably for the unemployment rate. For unemployment, the rejections between
2009 and 2011 are so strong that they lead to the rejections in the joint tests.3
The joint efficiency of the entire projection is accepted in most cases.
In order to compare the results, I apply the same tests to the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF) forecast. Similar to the FOMC’s projections, the
efficiency of the SPF’s inflation forecast is accepted in most cases. On the other
hand, the SPF’s unemployment forecast is not as inefficient as FOMC’s unem-
ployment projections. This comparison highlights that the revisions of FOMC’s
unemployment projections have a much stronger autocorrelation, which may
reflect information rigidity in FOMC’s unemployment projections.
This strong rigidity in FOMC’s unemployment projections is puzzling for
two reasons. First, it is not consistent with Okun’s law, which draws an nega-
tive association between unemployment and GDP growth. Second, the FOMC’s
projections should in principle be at least as efficient as the SPF forecast, since
they have an access to the Greenbook forecast—a forecast that is prepared by
the staff of the Federal Reserve and generally more accurate than the SPF fore-
cast. In order to facilitate the accurate interpretation of these results, I discuss
the following explanations: (1) slower updating of FOMC’s beliefs about un-
employment, (2) FOMC’s conservatism about their unemployment projections,
and (3) different predictability of GDP growth and the unemployment rate.
Lastly, I provide an extension to the main results. I analyze the relationship
3For example, projections for the fourth quarter of 2009 are all revised upward through
2007 to 2009, as described in Figure 2.1, which is highly unlikely under the null hypothesis of
unpredictable forecast revisions.
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between the revisions of the FOMC’s GDP growth and unemployment projec-
tions to assess if they follow Okun’s law. The regression analysis shows that the
FOMC’s projections are consistent with Okun’s law only at the shorter horizons.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the
projections I use, and Section 2.3 describes the method of forecast evaluations
and provides a Monte Carlo exercise. Section 2.4 contains the main results
and Section 2.5 provides a regression analysis focusing on Okun’s law as an
extension. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data
The FOMC’s economic projections are numerical projections of four macroeco-
nomic series, real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, PCE inflation and Core
PCE inflation, over next two to three years. Each FOMC policymaker submits
his/her own projections at the FOMC meeting, and the range and the central
tendency of projections are published after the meeting. The central tendency
is the range of projections from which the three highest and lowest projections
are excluded. In this paper, I focus on the midpoints of the central tendency
and range to analyze the revisions of these projections.4
The FOMC has introduced these projections as a part of the Fed’s enhanced
communication strategy.5 In many respects, they are considerably more detailed
and informative than the old projections that had been released twice a year
with the monetary policy report to US Congress. First, these new projections
4The results based on the upper end or the lower end of the projections are generally
similar as the results using the midpoint of the projections. Gavin and Pande (2008) and
Fischer, Garćıa-Bárzana, Tillmann, and Winker (2014) discuss the implication and caveats of
taking the midpoints of intervals of FOMC’s projections.
5For details, see Bernanke (2007) and Mishkin (2007).
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have been published more frequently than the old projections, four times a year,
in March, June, September, and December.6 Because FOMC policymakers have
a chance to revise their projections right after the meeting, these projections can
be regarded as the forecasts conditional on the information set of the meeting
day.
Second, the horizons of new projections have been extended to three years;
the old projections had a two-year horizon. The new projections aim to forecast
the level of unemployment rate in the fourth quarter, and the rate of changes
of real GDP and prices in the fourth quarter from a year earlier.
There are at most fourteen projections, and thus thirteen consecutive re-
visions, for an individual target year. Since these projections are newly intro-
duced, the number of revisions for some target year is limited. In my dataset, I
have eight revisions for 2009, twelve revisions for 2010 and 2011, thirteen revi-
sions for 2012 and 2013, and eleven revisions for 2014. The projections for 2008
and 2015 are dropped because the sample is too small.
Even though more detailed distribution of FOMC’s projections is published
three weeks after the meeting, it is anonymous and I cannot match individ-
ual policymaker’s responses across different series and periods. Accordingly, I
primarily focus on the central tendency and range of the projections.
2.3 Method
This section describes the tests I use to evaluate the efficiency of FOMC’s pro-
jections. Based on an implication of forecast efficiency that the revisions are
6The projections used to be released typically in January, April, June, and November. But
the FOMC has changed the timing since 2012, by releasing five projections in 2012.
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unpredictable, I propose several tests focusing on time-series property or signs
of forecast revisions. In addition, I propose the joint tests using the average
across target years and series as the test statistics. Then, I describe the infer-
ence based on the bootstrap. Lastly, I provide a Monte Carlo exercise assessing
the size and power of the tests to show that small sample issues are not too
pronounced.
2.3.1 Testable Implication of Forecast Efficiency
The idea of a forecast efficiency test using revisions dates back to Nordhaus
(1987). Essentially, it is based on the implication that forecast revisions are
unpredictable.7 To formalize the idea, suppose that yt is a variable of interest,
and denote ŷt+h|t as a forecast for period t + h, based on the set of variables
observed in period t, Xt. Then define the forecast revision for period t + h
between t and t+j, for any j such that 0 < j < h, as rt+h|t,t+j ≡ ŷt+h|t+j− ŷt+h|t.
It is well known that the optimal forecast is the conditional expectation
of the series under a symmetric loss function. Therefore, the realized value
at period t + h is the sum of the conditional expectation, E[yt+h|Xt], and its
uncorrelated forecast error, et+h|t:
yt+h = E[yt+h|Xt] + et+h|t. (2.1)
Then, the revision between t and t + j is described as the difference between
7Isiklar, Lahiri, and Loungani (2006) also evaluate the efficiency of Consensus Economics
forecast by testing the unpredictability of revisions. For more recent application, see Loungani,
Stekler, and Tamirisa (2013) and Sheng (forthcoming).
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forecast errors in period t and t+ j:
rt+h|t,t+j = E[yt+h|Xt+j]− E[yt+h|Xt],
= et+h|t − et+h|t+j . (2.2)
Since et+h|t is also uncorrelated to Xt+j , rt+h|t,t+j is uncorrelated to Xt+j . As
a result, revisions of the efficient forecasts are uncorrelated to any observable
variables. By setting the maximum forecast horizon as H , the sequence of con-
secutive forecast revisions are described as {rt+H|t+h−1,t+h}
H−1
h=0 . In this paper, I
primarily focus on this sequence of forecast revisions.8
2.3.2 Test for Individual Year and Series
In order to test the efficiency of FOMC’s projections for an individual target
year and series, I propose the methods focusing on two different properties of
forecast revisions: time-series properties and signs of forecast revisions.
2.3.2.1 Tests Using Time-Series Properties of Revisions
For the tests using time-series properties of forecast revisions, I use three sum-
mary statistics: (1) Bias, (2) First-order autocorrelation, and (3) Wald statistic
of the first-order autoregression. To define these statistics formally, consider a
first-order autoregression of forecast revisions:
rt+H|t+h−1,t+h = αt+H + βt+H · rt+H|t+h−2,t+h−1 + εt+h. (2.3)
The forecast efficiency implies both the intercept, αt+H , and the coefficient,
βt+H , are zero. The first test statistic, the bias of forecast revisions, tests if
8As pointed out by Patton and Timmermann (2012), incorporating forecast revisions will
make the forecast evaluation significantly more powerful, which could be even used to improve
the accuracy of forecasts as discussed in Arai (2014).
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The second test statistic, the first-order autocorrelation of forecast revisions,
tests if βt+H = 0. The sample autocorrelation is computed as the ratio of














(rt+H|t+h−1,t+h − r̄t+H)(rt+H|t+h+j−1,t+h+j − r̄t+H) for j = 0, 1.
I use the sample mean r̄t+H to measure the deviations of lagged series, and the
total number of revisions H to normalize.
The third test statistic, the Wald statistic, jointly tests if θt+H ≡ [αt+H , βt+H ]
′
is a zero vector. The sample Wald statistic is computed as follows:




where Avar(θ̂t+H) is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of θ̂t+H . I es-
timate the asymptotic variance without any autocorrelation correction because
the forecast efficiency implies that revisions are serially uncorrelated.
2.3.2.2 Tests Using Signs of Revisions
For the tests using signs of forecast revisions, I use two summary statistics:
(1) Ratio of positive forecast revisions and (2) Ratio of the cases in which the
consecutive forecast revisions have the same sign. The advantage of focusing on
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signs is that it gives the exact distribution of test statistics, which enables us
to do the exact test.
The first test statistic summarizes how often the forecast revision is positive.
Since the sign of revisions can be regarded as an outcome of the Bernoulli trial
under the forecast efficiency, the number of positive revisions should follow
Binomial (H, 0.5). I divide it by H to normalize as the ratio.
To define the test statistic, first define the indicator variable iPt+H|t+h for a
target period of t+H :
iPt+H|t+h =
{
1 if rt+H|t+h−1,t+h > 0 for h = 0, . . . , H − 1,
0 otherwise.
(2.7)
Then, the test statistic is defined as the ratio of the sum of these indicator








Similarly, I can define the second test statistic, which summarizes how of-
ten the consecutive forecast revisions have the same sign, as being either pos-
itive or negative. Since such event can also be regarded as an outcome of
Bernoulli trial under the forecast efficiency, the number of such cases should
follow Binomial (H − 1, 0.5). I divide it by H − 1 to normalize as the ratio.
Let iCt+H|t+h be the indicator variable for a target period of t+H :
iCt+H|t+h =
{
1 if rt+H|t+h−1,t+h · rt+H|t+h,t+h+1 > 0 for h = 0, . . . , H − 2,
0 otherwise.
(2.9)
Then, the test statistic is defined as the ratio of the sum of these indicator









When a value of the forecast revision is zero, I compute these test statistics
in two steps. First, I randomly assign a sign with the probability of 0.5 to
compute these statistics. Second, I repeat this random assignment many times
(100 times in this paper) to treat the mean as the test statistic.
One concern about focusing on signs is that it may over-simplify the forecast
revisions, and thus the tests may not have enough power. However, as presented
in a Monte Carlo exercise and the empirical results, these tests reject the null
as many cases as the tests based on time-series properties, which suggests that
the loss of the power associated with this simplification is not detrimental.9
2.3.3 Joint Test Across Years and Series
One limitation of the efficiency tests for an individual year and series is that
they may not have enough power due to the short sample. In order to make
tests more powerful, I compute the joint test statistics across different years and
series by averaging individual test statistics.
First, I compute the average of individual test statistics across different
target years. Define the vector of individual test statistics for the target year t
as xt ≡ {r̄t, ρ̂
1




t } for some series. Then the vector of joint test statistics
from year Ts to year Te is defined as the average of individual test statistics:
x̄ ≡
1





Second, I compute the average of these statistics across all series as the
test statistic for the entire projections. The formal expression is abbreviated to
conserve space.
9Campbell and Ghysels (1995, 1997) also apply the similar tests to budget forecasts in the
US and Canada, and claim that these tests have good finite sample power.
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2.3.4 Inference
I conduct the exact tests for the individual tests using signs, and approximate
tests based on the bootstrap for other individual tests and joint tests. I report
one-sided p-values for the Wald statistics and their averages, and two-sided
p-values for other test statistics.
The bootstrap p-values are computed based the null hypothesis that the
FOMC’s projections are efficient, and therefore their revisions are serially un-
correlated. However, to keep the correlation among the forecast revisions at
different horizons, I construct the artificial projections by resampling a block of
multiple forecast revisions made at the same period. In addition, I apply the
wild bootstrap to the FOMC’s forecast revisions, in which I flip the sign of the
resampled revisions with the probability of 0.5. This is because the distribution
of forecast revisions are symmetric under the null hypothesis.
After constructing artificial projections, I apply the same tests to obtain the
bootstrap test statistics. By repeating this procedure arbitrarily many times,
I can form the distribution of bootstrap test statistics and report the p-value
based on the percentile of the sample test statistics.
2.3.5 Monte Carlo Exercise
I conduct a Monte Carlo exercise to assess the size and power of the tests. The
simulation results show that the size is generally close to the nominal size and
some tests are powerful even with a small sample.
By constructing artificial forecast revisions using a reduced-form VAR, I
first check if the actual probability of rejections is close to the nominal size.
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Then, I construct three types of inefficient forecasts to assess the power: (1)
Forecasts with the independent noise, (2) Forecasts with the persistent noise
across multiple horizons, and (3) Forecasts with the sluggish adjustments.10 I
use the data from 1984 to 2012 to calibrate the series, which includes both the
Great Moderation and the period after the Great Recession, but excludes the
period before the Great Moderation. The specific steps are described in detail
in the Appendix B.
The simulation results with the nominal size of 10% are presented in Tables
2.1 to 2.4. The size is generally close to the nominal size in most individual
tests. However, the consecutive sign test tends to be slightly oversized, and the
joint test across different years and series tends to be oversized, with the actual
size up to 23.6%.
For the power of the tests, the results show that the autocorrelation, Wald,
and consecutive sign tests are much more powerful than the other two tests,
and their higher power is robust across different simulations.11 In particular,
the autocorrelation and consecutive sign tests have an extremely high power
close to 1, in all joint tests. These results show that some tests used in this
paper are considerably powerful even with a small sample, against a set of
reasonable simulations where the forecasts are not efficient.
10The variance of the noise is set to be unity in both the first and second simulations.
However, the results are generally similar when the sample variance of each series is used.
11However, the poor power of the bias and positive sign tests is primarily due to the design of
the simulations, in which all inefficient forecasts have the same mean as the efficient forecasts.
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2.4 Results
In this section, I present the efficiency evaluation of FOMC’s projections, show-
ing that the efficiency is rejected often for real economic variables, especially
for the unemployment rate, while it is accepted for inflation. Then I compare
the results with the SPF forecasts to highlight that the revisions of FOMCs
unemployment projections have a much stronger autocorrelation, which may
suggest information rigidity of the projections. Then I discuss that slow updat-
ing, conservatism, or different predictability could help explain such rigidity.
2.4.1 FOMC’s Economic Projections
The results using the midpoints of the central tendency and the range are pre-
sented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. The results show that there is a
stark contrast between the forecast efficiency of real economic projections and
inflation projections. While the efficiency is accepted for inflation in almost all
target years, it is rejected in many cases for real economic variables, notably for
the unemployment rate. In particular, for the unemployment rate, the efficiency
is rejected in most individual tests for the target years of 2009–2011. Further-
more, the joint efficiency is rejected in most joint tests across different target
years because the rejections between 2009 and 2011 are so strong. Unlike the
case of unemployment projections, the efficiency of output growth projections is
accepted in most cases. The joint efficiency of the entire projections is accepted




The results of the SPF forecasts using the mean and the median are presented
in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Similar to the FOMC’s projections, the ef-
ficiency of the SPF’s real GDP growth and unemployment forecasts is rejected
more often than inflation forecasts. However, the efficiency of the SPF’s un-
employment forecast is rejected only in 2009, which is not as strong as the
rejections of FOMC’s projections.
The comparison between the FOMC’s projections and the SPF forecast
shows that the revisions of FOMC’s unemployment projections have much
stronger autocorrelations. For example, the autocorrelations of the revisions
for 2010 and 2011 are 0.00 and -0.03 for the SPF forecast (mean) but 0.53 and
0.48 for FOMC’s projections (central tendency), respectively.
Such significant autocorrelations in the revisions may reflect information
rigidity in FOMC’s unemployment projections. For example, Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2010) observe a substantial degree of correlation among the
SPF’s forecast revisions, and consider it as evidence of information rigidity.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) also show that a broad range of survey fore-
casts substantially deviate from the null hypothesis of full information, and show
that their finding is consistent with the predictions of macroeconomic models
with information rigidity. However, it should be noted that the FOMC’s projec-
tions and the SPF forecast forecast differ slightly with respect to their targets
and horizons,12 and these differences may lead to their divergent evaluations of
12The SPF forecasts are different from the FOMC’s projections in two ways. First, the
availability of longer-horizon forecasts are limited; Three-year ahead SPF forecasts starts
from 2009Q2 for GDP growth and unemployment, and two-year ahead SPF forecasts start




The strong rigidity of FOMC’s unemployment forecasts is puzzling for two rea-
sons. First, it is inconsistent with Okun’s law, which draws an negative associ-
ation between unemployment and GDP growth. In other words, if forecasters
follow Okun’s law, evaluations of GDP growth forecasts and unemployment
forecasts should be similar.13 Second, the FOMC’s projections should be in
principle at least as efficient as the SPF forecast, because the FOMC has an
access to the Greenbook forecast, which is generally more accurate than the
SPF forecast. To facilitate the accurate interpretation of these results, I list a
number of possible explanations.
First, FOMC policymakers may have gradually learned of the effect of the
Great Recession on the unemployment rate over the course of multiple years.
As a result, the updating of their beliefs about unemployment happens at a
rate slower than that about GDP growth. Considering that FOMC policy-
makers have made substantial revisions to their unemployment projections at
time-horizons exceeding one year, slower updating could be a likely cause of
inefficiency.
Second, FOMC policymakers may be conservative about their projections
and unemployment; the SPF forecasts aim to forecast the annual average rate of GDP growth
and level of unemployment.
13For the analysis of Okun’s law during the Great Recession, see Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin
(2010) and Daly and Hobijn (2010). Some FOMC policymakers, such as Yellen (2010) and
Bernanke (2012b), observe that both the jump in the unemployment rate in 2009 and its
decline in 2011 were not anticipated by Okun’s law. Ball, Leigh, and Loungani (2012) examine
cross-country data and argue that Okun’s law did not substantially change during the Great
Recession. Daly, Fernald, Òscar Jordà, and Nechio (2014) claim that the deviation is not
substantial considering the recent data revisions.
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for various reasons. For example, they may be concerned about the signalling
value of their projections. In other words, FOMC policymakers may be cau-
tious about changing their projections, because such changes would convey a
message about future economic conditions. As a result, this concern may lead to
smoothing in their projections. In addition, FOMC policymakers may focus on
worst-case scenarios in their projections.14 More specifically, even if the FOMC
policymakers were to correctly recognize developments within the labor market,
they may be conservative in updating their beliefs, because their recognition is
subject to misjudgment in real time. Such considerations may also lead to
the inefficiency in their projections. Other factors—such as strategic behavior
among committee members or concern for their reputations as forecasters—
could also be causes of FOMC’s conservatism. Using a dataset of FOMC’s old
projections presented by Romer (2010), which includes the individual forecasts
of each policymaker, Nakazono (2013), Rülke and Tillmann (2011), and Till-
mann (2011) each point out that the forecasting behavior of FOMC members
varies with their status within the committee (i.e., governors vs. voting mem-
bers vs. nonvoting members). For example, they find that governors tend to
have views close to the consensus whereas non-governors tend to have extreme
views, which suggests that FOMC members strategically use their forecasts to
influence FOMC’s decisions. Jain (2013) suggests that forecasters’ reluctance
to make substantial revisions is sufficiently strong to lead to substantial forecast
14Responding to Romer and Romer’s (2008) criticism of the FOMC in terms of its inferior
forecasting performance relative to the Greenbook forecast, Ellison and Sargent (2012) provide
a defense by allowing the FOMC to doubt the economic model that underpins the Greenbook
forecast. They claim that it is inappropriate to evaluate FOMC’s forecasting performance




Finally, differences in predictability between output growth and the unem-
ployment rate may lead us to reject the efficiency of unemployment projections
more frequently. As Tulip (2009) points out, output growth has essentially be-
come unpredictable after the Great Moderation. Consistent with his argument,
the output growth and unemployment rates simulated in the Monte Carlo ex-
ercise in Section 2.3.5 also exhibit substantially different predictability. When
projecting the artificial realized series on the conditional expectation, average
R-square is 0.202 for the output growth whereas 0.960 for the unemployment
rate. Since the forecast evaluation proposed in this paper tests the unpre-
dictability of forecast revisions, it could be easier for us to detect inefficiency in
more predictable series, namely the unemployment rate.
2.5 Extension
To shed some light on the reason why the rejections of efficiency are stronger for
the unemployment rate than GDP growth, I provide a regression analysis to as-
sess if the FOMC’s projections numerically follow Okun’s law. Since Okun’s law
conventionally associates 1% faster GDP growth from the potential with 0.5%
decline in the unemployment rate, the slope coefficient of the unemployment
revisions on output growth revisions should be around -0.5. In addition to the
analysis of revisions at individual horizons, I provide the analysis of cumulative
revisions, which add up he revisions at all horizons, to see if these projections
follow Okun’s law in a medium term.
The confidence interval is computed by the block bootstrap, in which the
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artificial sample of a year is constructed by resampling from the sample of the
same year. For example, an artificial sample of 2009 is made by resampling
only from the sample of 2009. This is because the news at the current period
could influence the forecasts both at shorter and longer horizons, and therefore
its effect would likely to persist more than a year. As a result, I need to keep
the correlation between the current revision and the revisions made more than
a year before.
The results presented in Table 2.9 show that the FOMC’s projections are
consistent with Okun’s law at shorter horizons, but inconsistent at the longer
horizon. For nowcasts and 1-year ahead projections, correlations are negative:
-0.41 and -0.81 for the central tendency and -0.41 and -0.72 for the range, respec-
tively. On the other hand, the correlation in 2-year ahead projections is positive
but the confidence interval is extremely wide. This is because FOMC partici-
pants substantially revise their 2-year ahead unemployment projections without
changing the output growth projections. As a result, R2 of the regression be-
comes very small. Furthermore, this large variation in unemployment revisions
at 2-year horizon makes the slope coefficient of cumulative revisions strongly
negative, -0.91 for the central tendency and -0.89 for the range. Figures 2.2 and
2.3 show the plots of the FOMC’s GDP growth revisions and unemployment
revisions based on the central tendency and the range, respectively, highlighting
the difference between the projections at shorter and longer horizons.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the efficiency of FOMC’s new economic projections
by testing if their forecast revisions are unpredictable. These projections are
released from 2007, and play an increasingly important role in formulation of
U.S. monetary policy. Therefore, evaluating the quality of these projections is
a matter of great importance for macroeconomists.
By applying several statistical tests focusing on the unpredictability of fore-
cast revisions, I find that the efficiency of FOMC’s projections is accepted for
inflation in almost all target years, but often rejected for real economic variables,
notably for the unemployment rate. Furthermore, the comparison with the SPF
forecast shows that the inefficiency of FOMC’s unemployment projections is due
to the strong autocorrelation in revisions, which may reflect information rigidity
in their unemployment projections.
I discuss that such strong rigidity may be related to three factors: slower
updating of FOMC’s beliefs about unemployment, FOMC’s conservatism about
their unemployment projections, and different predictability of GDP growth
and the unemployment rate. Further research on disentangling these channels,
especially using disaggregated data if it becomes public in the future, would yield
a much better understanding of FOMC’s decision making and their conduct of
U.S. monetary policy.
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Figure 2.1: Revisions to FOMC’s Unemployment Projections (Targeting
2009Q4)
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Figure 2.2: Revisions to FOMC’s GDP Growth and Unemployment Projections
(Central Tendency)
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Panel A: Size of the Test (Individual Year)
GDP growth 0.099 0.126 0.117 0.089 0.150
Unemployment 0.096 0.105 0.090 0.087 0.144
PCE 0.105 0.113 0.096 0.101 0.148
Core PCE 0.096 0.097 0.087 0.102 0.125
Panel B: Size of the Tests (Average of Five Years)
GDP growth 0.100 0.131 0.133 0.102 0.127
Unemployment 0.096 0.110 0.099 0.108 0.128
PCE 0.096 0.111 0.104 0.108 0.119
Core PCE 0.103 0.118 0.105 0.113 0.111
Panel C: Size of the Joint Test Across Years
GDP growth 0.108 0.127 0.193 0.106 0.122
Unemployment 0.094 0.113 0.093 0.097 0.093
PCE 0.099 0.110 0.121 0.094 0.089
Core PCE 0.105 0.113 0.107 0.111 0.085
Panel D: Size of the Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.061 0.236 0.190 0.191 0.226
a.The results are based on 1,000 simulations, where the bootstrap with 1,000 replications is used
for the inference in each simulation.






Panel A: Power of the Tests (Individual Year)
GDP growth 0.000 0.312 0.216 0.015 0.187
Unemployment 0.000 0.326 0.236 0.008 0.207
PCE 0.000 0.375 0.255 0.012 0.221
Core PCE 0.000 0.369 0.251 0.009 0.212
Panel B: Power of the Tests (Average of Five Years)
GDP growth 0.001 0.287 0.190 0.024 0.134
Unemployment 0.000 0.292 0.206 0.020 0.149
PCE 0.000 0.310 0.215 0.017 0.151
Core PCE 0.000 0.315 0.216 0.018 0.153
Panel C: Power of the Joint Test Across Years
GDP growth 0.002 0.816 0.274 0.013 0.664
Unemployment 0.004 0.848 0.324 0.015 0.693
PCE 0.000 0.867 0.342 0.017 0.714
Core PCE 0.000 0.883 0.334 0.009 0.732
Panel D: Power of the Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.000 1.000 0.578 0.011 0.998
a. Same as Table 2.1.






Panel A: Power of the Tests (Individual Year)
GDP growth 0.003 0.283 0.210 0.008 0.179
Unemployment 0.000 0.326 0.215 0.009 0.190
PCE 0.000 0.338 0.239 0.005 0.194
Core PCE 0.001 0.349 0.262 0.010 0.192
Panel B: Power of the Tests (Average of Five Years)
GDP growth 0.001 0.276 0.196 0.021 0.147
Unemployment 0.000 0.282 0.191 0.020 0.137
PCE 0.000 0.296 0.203 0.018 0.140
Core PCE 0.000 0.315 0.221 0.018 0.147
Panel C: Power of the Joint Test Across Years
GDP growth 0.000 0.573 0.255 0.001 0.469
Unemployment 0.000 0.536 0.254 0.010 0.372
PCE 0.000 0.592 0.271 0.005 0.428
Core PCE 0.000 0.574 0.299 0.006 0.412
Panel D: Power of the Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.000 0.986 0.466 0.007 0.930
a. Same as Table 2.1.






Panel A: Power of the Tests (Individual Year)
GDP growth 0.219 0.298 0.274 0.160 0.426
Unemployment 0.244 0.532 0.363 0.192 0.489
PCE 0.228 0.393 0.312 0.198 0.479
Core PCE 0.249 0.407 0.313 0.192 0.484
Panel B: Power of the Tests (Average of Five Years)
GDP growth 0.222 0.264 0.284 0.191 0.363
Unemployment 0.238 0.469 0.321 0.199 0.409
PCE 0.231 0.339 0.284 0.203 0.406
Core PCE 0.246 0.363 0.290 0.209 0.409
Panel C: Power of the Joint Test Across Years
GDP growth 0.206 0.690 0.471 0.176 0.631
Unemployment 0.234 0.825 0.475 0.197 0.499
PCE 0.242 0.817 0.483 0.219 0.575
Core PCE 0.241 0.798 0.464 0.224 0.512
Panel D: Power of the Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.188 0.997 0.707 0.315 0.958
a. Same as Table 2.1.






Panel A: Real GDP Growth
2009 -0.344∗ 0.370∗ 2.643 0.371 0.643
2010 -0.008 0.107 0.450 0.628 0.545
2011 -0.129 -0.058 4.432 0.335 0.404
2012 -0.185 0.146 6.054 0.236 0.627
2013 -0.138 -0.276 7.910∗ 0.231∗ 0.667
2014 -0.114 -0.185 4.669 0.322 0.392
Panel B: Unemployment Rate
2009 0.644∗∗∗ 0.206 8.638∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
2010 0.400∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 10.953∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.636
2011 0.250∗ 0.478∗∗ 8.454∗∗ 0.583 0.636
2012 0.054 0.036 0.486 0.464 0.500
2013 -0.008 0.073 0.061 0.309 0.667
2014 -0.109 -0.461 7.157 0.182∗ 0.600
Panel C: PCE Inflation
2009 -0.088 0.235 0.658 0.554 0.490
2010 -0.038 0.046 0.653 0.539 0.455
2011 0.104 -0.129 2.377 0.583 0.364
2012 0.008 -0.632∗∗ 7.724∗ 0.494 0.320
2013 -0.050 -0.134 1.332 0.462 0.376
2014 -0.014 0.028 0.787 0.502 0.496
Panel D: Core PCE Inflation
2009 -0.044 0.115 0.255 0.696 0.653
2010 -0.058 0.093 1.089 0.511 0.478
2011 0.029 -0.031 2.001 0.626 0.456
2012 0.023 -0.063 0.076 0.462 0.417
2013 -0.031 0.370∗ 3.206 0.460 0.498
2014 -0.018 -0.319 1.894 0.508 0.400
Panel E: Joint Tests Across Years
GDP Growth -0.153∗∗ 0.017 4.360 0.354∗∗ 0.546
Unemployment 0.205∗∗ 0.143∗ 5.958∗∗ 0.562 0.673∗∗
PCE -0.013 -0.098 2.255 0.522 0.417
Core PCE -0.016 0.027 1.420 0.544 0.484
Panel F: Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.006 0.023∗ 3.498 0.495 0.530
a. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
The bootstrap inference is based on 10,000 replications.






Panel A: Real GDP Growth
2009 -0.331∗ 0.370∗ 2.469 0.500 0.429
2010 -0.004 0.008 0.064 0.616 0.640
2011 -0.150 0.078 2.964 0.376 0.453
2012 -0.162 -0.123 7.434∗ 0.268 0.542
2013 -0.131 -0.124 8.614∗ 0.272 0.582
2014 -0.132 0.113 69.335∗ 0.235 0.540
Panel B: Unemployment Rate
2009 0.656∗∗∗ 0.117 7.629∗ 0.750∗ 0.571
2010 0.400∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗ 10.763∗∗ 0.750∗∗ 0.818∗∗
2011 0.242∗ 0.364∗ 6.692∗ 0.667 0.455
2012 0.077 0.139 1.406 0.580 0.545
2013 0.012 0.057 0.053 0.346 0.833∗∗
2014 -0.114 0.186 13.909∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.766
Panel C: PCE Inflation
2009 -0.063 0.262 0.583 0.443 0.571
2010 -0.037 0.210 1.222 0.493 0.635
2011 0.133 -0.213 2.339 0.464 0.507
2012 0.035 -0.185 0.568 0.732∗ 0.459
2013 -0.012 0.136 0.318 0.466 0.617
2014 -0.023 -0.017 0.171 0.365 0.602
Panel D: Core PCE Inflation
2009 -0.037 0.110 0.378 0.549 0.397
2010 -0.050 -0.065 0.644 0.451 0.438
2011 0.046 -0.252 3.189 0.510 0.465
2012 0.035 0.071 0.431 0.467 0.543
2013 -0.008 0.080 0.122 0.465 0.410
2014 -0.018 -0.481 3.086 0.417 0.300
Panel E: Joint Test Across Years
GDP Growth -0.152∗∗ 0.054 5.147∗ 0.378 0.531
Unemployment 0.212∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 6.742∗∗ 0.537 0.665∗∗
PCE 0.006 0.032 0.867 0.494 0.565
Core PCE -0.005 -0.089 1.308 0.476 0.426
Panel F: Joint Test Across Years and Series
0.015 0.055∗∗ 3.516 0.471 0.547
a. Same as Table 2.5.






Panel A: Real GDP Growth
2009 -0.723∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗ 8.728∗ 0.286 0.833∗∗
2010 0.085 0.186 1.301 0.571 0.667
2011 -0.104 -0.134 1.148 0.300 0.444
2012 -0.071 -0.086 0.974 0.286 0.692∗
2013 -0.095 -0.328 9.012∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.714∗
2014 -0.109 -0.022 2.913 0.286 0.462
2015 -0.005 -0.813∗∗∗ 23.645∗∗∗ 0.500 0.111∗∗
Panel B: Unemployment Rate
2009 0.587∗∗∗ 0.352∗ 10.617∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
2010 0.143 0.005 0.085 0.571 0.500
2011 0.045 -0.032 0.127 0.600 0.556
2012 0.043 0.002 0.071 0.571 0.462
2013 0.008 -0.003 0.050 0.333 0.571
2014 -0.051 0.113 0.564 0.214∗ 0.692∗
2015 -0.091 0.260 3.807 0.200 0.556
Panel C: PCE Inflation
2008 0.124 -0.228 1.120 0.714 0.500
2009 -0.089 -0.008 0.518 0.636 0.600
2010 -0.104 -0.286 5.864 0.364 0.500
2011 0.085 -0.035 0.811 0.545 0.500
2012 -0.024 -0.494 4.043 0.545 0.200
2013 -0.064 0.093 8.167 0.273 0.700
2014 -0.043 -0.052 1.629 0.200 0.778∗∗
Panel D: Core PCE Inflation
2008 0.039 0.041 1.492 0.714 0.667
2009 -0.053 0.052 0.680 0.455 0.500
2010 -0.093∗ -0.193 7.172∗ 0.182∗ 0.700
2011 0.021 0.230 0.640 0.545 0.600
2012 -0.019 -0.038 0.185 0.364 0.400
2013 -0.045 -0.036 4.420 0.455 0.700
2014 -0.038 -0.020 2.557 0.200 0.667
Panel E: Joint Test Across Years
GDP Growth -0.146∗∗ -0.106 6.817∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.561
Unemployment 0.098∗ 0.100 2.189 0.499 0.619
PCE -0.016 -0.144 3.165 0.468 0.540
Core PCE -0.027 0.005 2.449 0.416 0.605
a. Same as Table 2.5.






Panel A: Real GDP Growth
2009 -0.748∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 9.166∗ 0.286 0.833∗∗
2010 0.073 0.145 0.884 0.571 0.667
2011 -0.075 -0.099 0.753 0.500 0.333
2012 -0.057 -0.434 4.381 0.429 0.462
2013 -0.096 -0.317 3.549 0.400 0.357
2014 -0.116 -0.237 2.684 0.357 0.385
2015 -0.000 -0.273 1.126 0.400 0.333
Panel B: Unemployment Rate
2009 0.597∗∗∗ 0.385∗ 11.784∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
2010 0.121 -0.049 0.029 0.714 0.667
2011 0.034 -0.052 0.045 0.600 0.556
2012 0.029 -0.015 0.009 0.500 0.462
2013 0.009 -0.025 0.112 0.333 0.571
2014 -0.072 0.059 0.661 0.286 0.692
2015 -0.099 -0.164 3.003 0.200 0.556
Panel C: PCE Inflation
2008 0.109 -0.192 0.872 0.714 0.500
2009 -0.087 -0.026 0.379 0.455 0.500
2010 -0.094 -0.342 5.663 0.273 0.500
2011 0.078 -0.012 0.549 0.455 0.300
2012 -0.019 -0.288 1.063 0.545 0.400
2013 -0.073 0.543∗∗ 16.636∗∗ 0.273 0.500
2014 -0.027 -0.193 1.283 0.400 0.444
Panel D: Core PCE Inflation
2008 0.036 0.382∗ 1.719 0.714 0.667
2009 -0.064 0.111 1.008 0.364 0.500
2010 -0.087∗∗ 0.096 8.339∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.700
2011 0.009 0.190 0.503 0.545 0.500
2012 -0.013 0.164 0.410 0.273 0.600
2013 -0.045 0.402∗ 5.028 0.455 0.700
2014 -0.030 -0.026 1.198 0.100∗∗∗ 0.500
Panel E: Joint Test Across Years
GDP Growth -0.146∗∗ -0.105 3.220 0.420 0.481
Unemployment 0.089 0.067 2.235 0.519 0.643∗
PCE -0.016 -0.073 3.778 0.445 0.449
Core PCE -0.028 0.189∗∗∗ 2.601 0.363 0.603∗∗∗
a. Same as Table 2.5.
Table 2.8: Efficiency Tests of the SPF Forecast (Median)
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Nowcast 1-Year Ahead 2-Year Ahead Cumulative
Panel A: Central Tendency
Slope -0.405 -0.812 0.288 -0.905
R2 0.367 0.491 0.029 0.415
90% Conf. Int. [-0.599, -0.166] [-0.934, -0.277] [-1.081, 0.745] [-1.164, -0.421]
Panel B: Range
Slope -0.414 -0.720 0.112 -0.890
R2 0.366 0.441 0.002 0.465
90% Conf. Int. [-0.580, -0.170] [-0.813, -0.324] [-1.019, 1.200] [-1.120, -0.500]
a.Analysis of cumulative revision is based on the sum of forecast revisions at all horizons.
b.Confidence interval is computed based on the block bootstrap.




Using Forecast Evaluation to
Improve the Accuracy of the
Greenbook Forecast
This chapter is a reprint from the article, “Using forecast evaluation
to improve the accuracy of the Greenbook forecast,” by Natsuki Arai,
in International Journal of Forecasting, 30(1), 12-19, with permis-
sion from Elsevier.
3.1 Introduction
Much research has been concerned with forecast efficiency regressions. Recently,
researchers have found evidence against efficiency in forecast efficiency regres-
sions in a multi-horizon system. This paper uses these tests to adjust the original
forecasts, and finds modest improvements for the Fed’s Greenbook forecast for
GDP deflator and CPI, but not for other variables.
In this paper, I propose a new method to improve the accuracy of forecasts
in real time, using the results of the forecast efficiency test. Based on the
evidence against the efficiency of the Greenbook forecast presented by Patton
78
and Timmermann (2012), this paper uses the new method to adjust systematic
errors of the Greenbook forecast in real time, building on the suggestion of
Croushore (2012).
I find modest, but statistically significant, improvements in the out-of-sample
forecast accuracy of the Greenbook forecast for GDP deflator and CPI. Since
Romer and Romer (2000) showed that the Greenbook forecast is more efficient
than private forecasts, the better performance of the Greenbook forecast in the
1980s has been documented in the literature. Sims (2002) confirms their result
that the Greenbook forecast is more accurate than private or näıve forecasts.
Faust and Wright (2009) show that the Greenbook forecast outperforms the
forecasts using reduced-form models, even after giving the Greenbook forecast
to these models for several quarters. In more recent periods, the Greenbook
forecast does not have this advantage (Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) and Edge
and Gürkaynak (2010)), but it is still an interesting benchmark for three reasons.
First, the Greenbook forecast is well known in the literature and researchers have
already analyzed its accuracy and efficiency from different perspectives. Second,
the Greenbook forecast is the most substantial and detailed judgmental US
macroeconomic forecast based on an immense range of information. Finally, as
indicated by FOMC minutes and transcripts, the Greenbook forecast has played
an essential role in US monetary policy.1
By comparing out-of-sample forecast errors during the Great Moderation,
this paper shows that the adjustment based on the forecast efficiency test gives
modest improvements for GDP deflator and CPI, but not for other variables.
The magnitude of improvements can be as high as 18 percent in root mean
1For details, see the NBER working paper version of Faust and Wright (2009).
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square prediction error.
The results that significant improvements can be found in the forecasts for
inflation, but not in the forecasts for output growth, are consistent with a finding
in the recent literature; namely, forecasts for output growth are hard to improve
given a good estimate of the current state of the economy, and output growth
is especially unpredictable during the Great Moderation.
The essential way in which the proposed method works is to determine if
Greenbook forecasters have over- or under-reacted to incoming news in the past
and then to propose a systematic adjustment for their past mistakes. Of course,
judgmental forecasters are also monitoring their own performance and making
these adjustments. It is possible that my correction, applied to the future
Greenbook forecasts, would over-correct and effectively make the adjustment
twice. However, the evidence that I show in this paper indicates that real-time
implementation of my proposed adjustment would have given better out-of-
sample forecasts than the Greenbook itself. That is, of course, no guarantee
of future performance, but indicates that the proposed adjustment might well
help.
Two methods of inference for nested forecasts—the bootstrap and the test
proposed by Clark and West (2007) (henceforth referred to as the CW test),
show that these improvements are statistically significant in some cases. The
comparison between these methods shows that they lead to the similar results,
but the CW test sometimes rejects the null even when the null model is es-
timated to be more accurate. This is because the CW test adjusts for the
parameter estimation error. It may seem surprising that the CW test can rec-
ommend using the less accurate forecasts, but this point was made by Clark
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and West (2007).
Lastly, I provide extensions to the main results. First, I apply the same
adjustment scheme to another subjective forecast, the SPF forecast. Second,
I use a different sample period for the application to the Greenbook forecast,
starting before the Great Moderation. The evidence from these two extensions
is mixed, but I still find statistically significant improvements in some cases.
Third, I provide an analysis in subperiods to shed some light on how the pro-
posed adjustment improves the forecast accuracy of the Greenbook forecast.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes
the forecasts and vintage data I use, and Section 3.3 explains the methodology
including the adjustment of forecast and inference. Section 3.4 contains the
main results and possible interpretation, and Section 3.5 provides extensions of
the main results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
This paper primarily focuses on the Greenbook forecasts for inflation and output
growth: GDP deflator, CPI inflation, Core CPI inflation and GDP growth.
The data for the Greenbook forecast are obtained from the Philadelphia Fed’s
website. Since the Greenbook forecast is the forecast prepared before the FOMC
meeting, which is usually held eight times a year, I pick the forecast that is
closest to the middle of each quarter to construct quarterly forecasts. Though
the Greenbook forecast has been released from 1964, its forecast horizons are
different, especially in early periods. With four-quarter forecast horizons, the
GDP deflator and the GDP growth forecasts are available from the second
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quarter of 1974, the CPI forecast is available from the fourth quarter of 1979,
and the Core CPI forecast is available from the first quarter of 1986.
In order to have comparability between different series and to focus on the
forecasts made during the Great Moderation, I use the data from the first quar-
ter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 2005 as a benchmark. Given Tulip (2009)’s
observation that the forecast errors made by the Greenbook forecast were largest
during early in the sample period, Faust and Wright (2009) set the sample be-
ginning in 1984 as their baseline case. I also follow this convention to prevent
the volatility of the data before the Great Moderation affecting the whole anal-
ysis. Since the Greenbook forecast becomes available to the public after a lag
of five years, the fourth quarter of 2005 is the most recent available data.
All forecasts and variables are quarterly, and all vintages are recorded quar-
terly. The vintage data are obtained from the Philadelphia Fed’s website. In-
flation and output growth rates are computed as annualized percent changes,
100∗(( xt
xt−1
)4−1), where xt is a price or output level at time t. The results using
the continuously compounding annual rate of change, 400 ∗ log( xt
xt−1
), are listed
in the online appendix, but the difference between these results is very small.
For CPI and Core CPI, I use the data recorded in December 2010 and treat the
data up until time t − 1 as a vintage of time t, ignoring the issues associated
with the lack of real-time data. This is because the availability of vintage data
for CPI and Core CPI is limited and the revisions to these two measures are
trivial. Quarterly price levels are computed by averaging the monthly values
for the three months in the quarter.
Using real-time data, it is important to adopt a definition of “the realized
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value”. In this paper, I follow Faust and Wright (2009) and treat the data re-
leased two quarters after the forecasted date as the realized value.2 For example,
I treat the output growth of the second quarter of 1994 recorded in the fourth
quarter of 1994 as the realized value for the computation of forecast errors.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Multi-Horizon Forecast Efficiency Evaluation
First, I apply the forecast efficiency evaluation across multiple horizons proposed
by Patton and Timmermann (2012) to the Greenbook forecast. Let yt+1 be a
variable at time t + 1 to be forecasted, and ŷt+1|t be a forecast of yt+1 at time
t. The standard Mincer-Zarnowitz regression to test forecast efficiency is given
by the following equation:
yt+1 = α + βŷt+1|t + εt+1. (3.1)
Since standard forecast efficiency implies that forecasts are the conditional mean
of forecasted variables, the null hypothesis is [α, β] = [0, 1].
Now define a revision of the forecast for t between t−i and t−j, for 0 < i < j,
as dt|i,j ≡ ŷt|t−i − ŷt|t−j . By definition, a recent forecast is described as the sum
of the forecast at a longer horizon and subsequent forecast revisions; ŷt|t−i =
ŷt|t−j +
∑j−1
k=i dt|k,k+1. By replacing the nowcast in Equation (3.1), ŷt+1|t, with
the sum of an old forecast and subsequent revisions, ŷt+1|t−j +
∑j
k=1 dt+1|k,k+1,
Equation (3.1) can be rewritten as follows:




γk dt+1|k,k+1 + εt+1, (3.2)
2For more detailed discussion, see Tulip (2009) and Faust and Wright (2009). On how
data revisions affect the qualitative implication of forecasting, see Croushore (2006).
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with the null hypothesis of [α, β, γ1, . . . , γj] = [0, 1, 1, . . . , 1], where j denotes the
number of forecast revisions included in the regression. This regression tests the
implication of forecast efficiency that forecasts are the conditional mean and the
subsequent revisions are orthogonal to the past forecasts. The F-test is used for
this regression to test the null hypothesis jointly. By a Monte Carlo simulation,
Patton and Timmermann (2012) show that this multi-horizon forecast efficiency
evaluation has higher power to detect forecast inefficiency in finite samples.
In addition, Patton and Timmermann (2012) apply this method to the
Greenbook forecast and reject its efficiency. Though Clements, Joutz, and Stek-
ler (2007) also reject the efficiency of the Greenbook forecast by pooling forecast
errors at different horizons, this multi-horizon approach is more straightforward.
This paper also primarily focuses on the Greenbook forecast in the following sec-
tions.
3.3.2 Adjustment of Forecast
Given the forecast evaluation described in the previous section, I propose a
simple method which is able to improve the accuracy of forecasts. Essentially, I
treat the predicted value from the forecast efficiency regression as a new forecast,
which adjusts the systematic errors of the original forecast.
Suppose that I evaluate forecast efficiency using the regression in Equa-
tion (3.2) every period. Specifically, I observe the following series in period t:
the vintage of the forecasted variable in period t, {yj+1|t, . . . , yt|t}, the Green-
book forecast j + 1 periods before, {ŷj+1|0, . . . , ŷt|t−j−1}, and subsequent revi-









. After evaluating forecast efficiency by us-
ing these series up until time t, I plug the forecast for period t + 1 made j + 1
periods before and subsequent revisions, ŷt+1|t−j and {dt+1|k,k+1}
j
k=1, into the
estimated equation, and treat its prediction as another forecast. In order to
simplify the algorithm and to use all available information, I treat the vintage
at each period as the realized value. This definition is given by the following
equation:





where α̂t, β̂t, {γ̂t,k}
j
k=1 are the estimated coefficients in Equation (3.2) in period
t. By repeating this procedure every period to obtain the predictions from the
forecast efficiency regression, I form the adjusted forecast in real time.
The intuition behind this adjustment is that the new forecast adjusts the
systematic errors the original forecast made in the past. If the null hypothesis
in Equation (3.2) is rejected, then it means that previous forecast revisions over-
or under-reacted to incoming news, or were systematically too optimistic or pes-
simistic, leading to inefficiencies in the original forecast. As a result, correcting
these systematic errors as in Equation (3.3) gives researchers an opportunity
to improve the accuracy of the original forecast. By construction, the adjusted
forecasts will not contain these systematic errors, and so the adjustment cannot
then be applied again. In his discussion of Patton and Timmermann (2012),
Croushore (2012) suggested the idea of using the test to create improved fore-
casts, which I am implementing in this paper.
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3.3.3 Extension to Longer-Horizon Forecasts
The extension of the baseline method to longer-horizon forecasts is straightfor-
ward: extend forecast horizon to h and focus on yt+h instead of yt+1. Then the
extended forecast evaluation becomes




γh,k dt+h|k,k+1 + εt+h (3.4)
with the null hypothesis of [αh, βh, γh,h, . . . , γh,h+j−1] = [0, 1, 1, . . . , 1]. The only
difference between Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.4) is that Equation (3.4)
does not contain recent forecast revisions, {dt+h|1,2, . . . , dt+h|h−1,h}, since they
are not available at time t. In other words, I replace recent forecast revisions by
old forecast revisions to evaluate forecast efficiency in real time. Then I define
the adjusted forecast in exactly the same way:





where α̂h|t, β̂h|t, {γ̂h|t,k}
h+j−1
k=h are the estimated coefficients in Equation (3.4)
using the series up until t. Trivially, it is a generalization of the forecast in Equa-
tion (3.3). Note that I can extend this model only for a few periods since the
number of horizons in the Greenbook forecast is limited, which is four quarters
ahead in my dataset.
3.3.4 Test Statistic and Inference
The natural metric to compare the forecast accuracy of the Greenbook forecast
and the adjusted forecast is the out-of-sample Relative Root Mean Square Pre-
diction Error (RRMSPE). The RRMSPE is defined as the ratio of the RMSPE
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of the adjusted forecast for h-period ahead, with the adjustment using j forecast










where ỹt+h|t,j is the adjusted forecast for t + h made at t using j forecast re-
visions, and ŷt+h|t is the Greenbook forecast for t + h made at t, and T is
the number of predictions. Since the RMSPE of the Greenbook forecast is in
the denominator, the RRMSPE larger than unity indicates that the Greenbook
forecast outperforms the adjusted forecast. Under the null hypothesis that the
Greenbook forecast is efficient, the RRMSPE has an expected value greater than
unity, because the in-sample over fitting worsens the out-of-sample predictive
accuracy in small samples.
Out-of-sample RRMSPEs are calculated after forty quarters from the start-
ing point of the sample of each series. Adjusted forecasts are computed in two
ways: recursive, in which the entire sample is used to estimate the model; and
rolling, in which the samples of the forty most recent quarters are used.
If I set [α̂h|t, β̂h|t, γ̂h|t,h, . . ., γ̂h|t,h+j−1]=[0, 1, 1, . . . , 1] for all t in Equation
(3.5) as is consistent with the null hypothesis, the adjusted forecast becomes
identical to the Greenbook forecast. In other words, the adjusted forecast nests
the Greenbook forecast. When forecasting models are nested, the distribution
of the test statistic presented in Diebold and Mariano (1995) is not asymptoti-
cally normal. The literature on forecast evaluation shows that testing the null
hypothesis of equal MSPE for nested models with normal critical values results
in severe size distortion and poor power in practice.3 Similarly, the RRMSPE
3For details, see West (2006) and Faust and Wright (2013).
87
for nested models has a nonstandard distribution and assessing its statistical
significance raises a number of econometric issues. In order to avoid these issues,
this paper uses two different methods of inference: bootstrap and the CW test.
3.3.4.1 Bootstrap
The bootstrap p-values are constructed by using the null hypothesis that the
Greenbook forecast is efficient and therefore it is a conditional mean of realized
series. By resampling from the residuals of the AR(4) model, I first make an
artificial realized series. Then I treat the conditional mean of an artificial series
as artificial Greenbook forecasts and construct adjusted forecasts in exactly
the same way. By computing the RRMSPE of these artificial forecasts and
repeating this procedure arbitrarily many times, I can form the distribution
of the bootstrap RRMSPE and report p-values of the realized RRMSPE. The
specific algorithm is described in detail in Appendix C.
3.3.4.2 The CW test
This paper uses the CW test as an alternative method of inference on nested
forecasts. The CW test first adjusts the noise in the MSPE due to the estimation
of additional parameters in an alternative forecasting model, which nests a
parsimonious null forecasting model. Then it tests the hypothesis that the null
forecasting model is correctly specified and the prediction errors of these two
models are the same in the population, by using normal critical values.4
The specific procedure is succinctly summarized in Section 2 of Clark and
4On the other hand, Clark and McCracken (2009) and Clark and McCracken (2011) discuss
inference to test the null hypothesis that two models have the equal RMSPE in finite sample.
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West (2007). In the context of this paper, I first compute the following statistic:
ft+h|t,j ≡ (ŷt+h|t − yt+h)
2 − [(ỹt+h|t,j − yt+h)
2 − (ŷt+h|t − ỹt+h|t,j)
2] (3.7)
where ŷt+h|t is the Greenbook forecast for t+h made at t, ỹt+h|t,j is the adjusted
forecast for t + h made at t using j revisions, and yt+h is the realized value
at t + h. Then I regress ft+h|t,j on a constant and derive the t-statistic. If
this t-statistic is larger than 1.282 or 1.645, I reject the null hypothesis at the
significance level of 10% or 5%, respectively. On the evidence from the Monte
Carlo exercise in finite samples, Clark and West (2007) argue that this t-statistic
is well approximated by a normal distribution, even though it has a nonstandard
asymptotic distribution.
3.4 Results
Recursive and rolling RRMSPEs of adjusted forecasts are reported in Table
3.1. Adjusted forecasts are computed for nowcasts through four-quarter ahead
forecasts (h = 1, . . . , 5), using as many revisions as possible; for example, the
adjusted nowcasts are based on four subsequent revisions, and one-period ahead
adjusted forecasts are based on three subsequent revisions. The results using
all the possible numbers of forecast revisions are listed in the online appendix.
3.4.1 Inflation and Output Growth
The results of the forecast accuracy of adjusted forecasts for inflation are mixed.
I find significant improvements for the CPI and GDP deflator forecasts both in
nowcasts and forecasts at longer horizons, whereas significant improvements for
the Core CPI forecasts are only found in nowcasts.
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For the CPI forecast, RRMSPEs are smaller than one at almost all hori-
zons, both in recursive and rolling regressions. In addition, most improvements
are statistically significant, the magnitude of which ranges from 4.1% to 13.0%,
where the significance level varies from 1% to 10%. This implies that the Green-
book forecast made systematic errors in its forecast for CPI and adjusting it
gives significant gains of forecast accuracy in real time. Also, there are many
cases where I find significant improvements for the GDP deflator forecast from
the adjustment, especially in rolling regressions. The magnitude of improve-
ments ranges from 4.2% to 18.0%. However, for the GDP deflator forecast, the
recursive results show few significant improvements unlike the rolling results.
Unlike the case of CPI and GDP deflator forecasts, significant improvements
for the Core CPI forecast are found only in nowcasts.
Faust and Wright (2009) show that the Greenbook forecast is such a good
forecast for inflation that it outperforms reduced-form forecasts, even after giv-
ing Greenbook’s nowcasts and longer-horizon forecasts to reduced-form forecast-
ing models for several quarters. Sims (2002) also suggests that the superiority
of the Greenbook forecast arises from its advantage in the timing of informa-
tion. However, the results presented here suggest that the Greenbook forecast,
(which incorporates economic judgment that perhaps make it perform better
than reduced-form models), still made systematic errors and so there is still
room to improve upon the Greenbook forecast.
On the other hand, the performance of the adjusted forecast for output
growth is quite different from that of the inflation forecasts. I find no improve-
ment either in recursive or rolling regressions. These results are consistent with
the findings in Tulip (2009) and Faust and Wright (2009) that output growth
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during the Great Moderation is largely unpredictable, especially at longer hori-
zons. Tulip (2009) argues that the predictable volatility of output growth van-
ishes during the Great Moderation.
3.4.2 Bootstrap and the CW Test
One objective of this paper is to compare the two different methods of inference,
bootstrap and the CW test, in the context of an important practical application.
As is evident from the results, the bootstrap and the CW test generally lead to
the similar results. However, there are some cases where the CW test rejects
the null despite the fact that the RRMSPE is larger than unity. This is because
the CW test adjusts for parameter estimation error. If the restricted model is
true, then it should give substantially more accurate forecasts in small samples,
because of parameter uncertainty. If the improvement is small enough, then we
could still conclude that the restricted model is to be rejected. It may seem
surprising that the CW test can recommend using the less accurate forecasts,
but it owes to the effects of parameter estimation error, as pointed out by Clark
and West (2007).5
A Monte Carlo simulation reported in the online appendix confirms these
results. It shows that the bootstrap inference is generally more conservative
than the CW test. The CW test is modestly oversized and has higher power,
whereas the bootstrap inference is modestly undersized and has lower power.
Which test gives higher size-adjusted power depends on the simulations.
5For example, see pp. 309 of Clark and West (2007).
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3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Comparison with the SPF Forecast
In order to see whether the adjusted forecast improves upon the original fore-
cast in the case of other judgmental forecasts, I apply the same adjustment to
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) forecast for GDP deflator, CPI
inflation and GDP growth. The data are obtained from the Philadelphia Fed’s
website.6 The recursive and rolling results are reported in Table 3.2. More
detailed results are reported in the online appendix.
The results using the SPF forecast are mixed. Unlike the case of the Green-
book forecast, I find few significant improvements either for inflation or for
output growth. Even though the overall accuracy of the SPF forecast is not
necessarily better than the Greenbook forecast, its errors are not as systematic
as the Greenbook and the adjustments using forecast evaluation can improve
the original forecast in a few but not all cases.
3.5.2 Different Subsamples
Generally, the accuracy of forecasts is very sensitive to the choice of sample
periods. For example, Edge and Gürkaynak (2010) show that none of the fore-
casts including the Greenbook forecast or forecasts using DSGE models perform
better than a constant forecast by looking at forecasts from 1992 to 2006, but
that contrasts with the results from earlier samples.
In order to see how the choice of sample period affects the results, I conduct
the same analysis by using the entire available sample: from the second quarter
6Core CPI is not included since the sample period is too short.
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of 1974 for GDP deflator and output growth, and the fourth quarter of 1979
for CPI inflation. The recursive and rolling results are reported in Table 3.3.
Even though there are some differences, the results of the samples from 1974 and
1979 are to some extent similar to the results of the subsample during the Great
Moderation. For inflation, there are significant improvements by adjustments
in both nowcasts and longer-horizon forecasts in rolling regressions. On the
other hand, for output growth, I see no significant improvements using either
recursive or rolling regressions.
The RRMSPEs of the adjusted SPF forecasts for the entire available samples
are listed in the online appendix to conserve space, but the results are generally
similar to the subsample from 1984. There are fewer improvements compared
to the case of the Greenbook forecast.
3.5.3 Analysis in Subperiods
To shed some light on how the proposed adjustment improves the forecast accu-
racy, I provide a simple analysis of forecast revisions and a breakdown of rolling
RRMSPEs in three subperiods: 1994 to 1997, 1998 to 2001, and 2002 to 2005.
First, Table 3.4 shows the sample average first-order autocorrelation and the
average bias of forecast revisions for each subperiod. Since forecast revisions for
the fixed target period are unpredictable under forecast efficiency, both the
first-order autocorrelation and the bias of forecast revisions should be zero.
However, the sample average first-order autocorrelations are negative for all
subperiods and series, and average biases are sometimes notably different from
zero for all series. These statistics suggest inefficiency in several subperiods.
For example, average autocorrelations for CPI are -0.250, -0.293 and -0.089 in
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the three subperiods.
Second, Table 3.5 shows the breakdown of rolling RRMSPEs of the adjusted
forecast to the Greenbook forecast for the same subperiods. The improvements
vary across the series and subperiods. The improvements of the adjusted fore-
casts for GDP deflator and CPI inflation are mainly due to the improvements in
the first and the last subperiods (1994 to 1997 and 2002 to 2005). To save space,
I have listed the breakdown of recursive RRMSPEs in the online appendix.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper addresses a question related to the Fed’s Greenbook forecast: Given
the evidence against the forecast efficiency of the Greenbook forecast, which
has been provided recently by multi-horizon forecast efficiency regressions, can
researchers improve its forecast accuracy in real time? I propose a new method
that uses this evidence against efficiency to adjust the Greenbook forecast. Us-
ing this method in a real-time out-of-sample forecasting exercise, I find that it
gives modest improvements in the forecast accuracy of the Greenbook forecast
for inflation. These improvements are statistically significant in some cases.
Specifically, I construct another forecast that adjusts systematic errors of the
Greenbook forecast in real time, by collecting the predictions of a multi-horizon
forecast efficiency regression every period. Then I compare out-of-sample per-
formance of the adjusted forecast and the Greenbook forecast. By focusing on
the Great Moderation, I find modest improvements from the adjustment for the
GDP deflator and CPI forecasts, but not for the forecasts for other variables.
The magnitude of improvement can be up to 18 percent in root mean square
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prediction error.
Given the results in this paper, one might be tempted to take a more general
approach to the Patton and Timmermann’s forecast evaluation regression, in
which the coefficients shrink toward one with a Bayesian algorithm. If the
prior is very dogmatic, then that would impose forecast efficiency. On the other
hand, a very diffuse prior would correspond to the approach in this paper. There
would be some possibilities between these two extreme approaches, but I leave
this generalization as a future exercise.
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Series GDP Deflator CPI Core CPI GDP Growth
Panel A: Recursive
Nowcasts 1.033 0.959∗∗∗‡ 0.952
∗∗
‡ 1.026
1Q Ahead 0.958∗‡ 1.009 1.036 1.073
2Q Ahead 1.002 0.952† 1.105 1.040
3Q Ahead 1.005 0.906∗∗‡ 1.050 1.031
4Q Ahead 0.997 0.954∗† 1.018 1.021






1Q Ahead 0.820∗∗∗‡ 0.906
∗∗∗
‡ 1.080 1.081
2Q Ahead 0.920∗∗‡ 0.899
∗∗
† 1.133 1.065
3Q Ahead 0.984 0.870∗∗∗‡ 1.137 1.065†
4Q Ahead 0.965 0.912∗∗† 1.085 1.060‡
a.This table shows the RRMSPEs of the adjusted forecast to the Greenbook forecast after
40 quarters from the first period. The Core CPI series start from 1986Q1 and all other
series start from 1984Q1. All series end in 2005Q4.
b. Superscripts, ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively, based on the bootstrap with 10,000 replications. For the construction of
bootstrap p-values, see Section 3.3.4.1 and Appendix C.
c. Subscripts, † and ‡, denote the significance at the level of 10% and 5%, respectively, based
on the CW test. Newey-West standard errors with the lag truncation of four are used.
Table 3.1: RRMSPE of the Adjusted Forecast to the Greenbook Forecast (The
Sample during the Great Moderation)
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Series GDP Deflator CPI GDP Growth
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Recursive
Nowcasts 1.053 1.043 0.987∗∗‡ 1.017 1.001
∗ 0.996∗
1Q Ahead 1.059† 1.031 1.005 1.010 1.042 1.031
2Q Ahead 1.017† 1.010 1.011 1.025 1.044 1.025
3Q Ahead 1.015 1.002 1.014 1.021 1.061 1.042
4Q Ahead 0.984† 1.012 1.012 1.016 1.000 1.022
Panel B: Rolling with Forty-Quarter Window
Nowcasts 0.983∗∗‡ 1.062 1.016
∗∗
‡ 1.053 1.207 1.169
1Q Ahead 1.047‡ 1.029 1.027 1.063 1.179 1.145
2Q Ahead 0.984‡ 1.017‡ 1.051 1.071 1.118 1.100
3Q Ahead 1.009‡ 1.044† 1.058 1.073 1.124 1.128
4Q Ahead 1.021† 1.033 1.035 1.050 1.084 1.110
a.This table shows the RRMSPEs of the adjusted forecast to the SPF forecast after 40 quarters
from the first period. All series start from 1984Q1, and end in 2005Q4.
b. Same as Table 3.1.
c. Same as Table 3.1.
Table 3.2: RRMSPE of the Adjusted Forecast to the SPF Forecasts (The Sample
during the Great Moderation)
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Series GDP Deflator CPI GDP Growth
Panel A: Recursive
Nowcasts 1.103 1.706 1.062
1Q Ahead 1.047 1.101† 1.023‡
2Q Ahead 1.040 1.102 1.053
3Q Ahead 1.055 1.048 1.018
4Q Ahead 1.067 1.002 1.031
Panel B: Rolling with Forty-Quarter Window
Nowcasts 1.024∗∗∗‡ 1.063† 1.091
1Q Ahead 0.945∗∗∗‡ 0.973
∗∗
‡ 1.037‡
2Q Ahead 0.993∗† 0.951† 1.058‡
3Q Ahead 1.036 0.856∗∗∗‡ 1.069†
4Q Ahead 1.054 0.931∗∗† 1.076†
a.This table shows the RRMSPEs of the adjusted forecast to the
Greenbook forecast after 40 quarters from the first period. The GDP
deflator and growth series start from 1974Q2 and the CPI series start
from 1979Q4. All series end in 2005Q4.
b.Same as Table 3.1.
c.Same as Table 3.1.
Table 3.3: RRMSPE of the Adjusted Forecast to the Greenbook
Forecast (The Entire Available Sample)
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Series GDP Deflator CPI Core CPI GDP Growth
Panel A: Average Autocorrelation
1994Q1-1997Q4 -0.210 -0.250 -0.206 -0.171
1998Q1-2001Q4 -0.271 -0.293 -0.205 -0.072
2002Q1-2005Q4 -0.110 -0.089 -0.134 -0.260
Panel B: Average Bias
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.011 -0.019 -0.027 0.086
1998Q1-2001Q4 -0.039 -0.022 -0.055 -0.077
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.030 0.191 0.019 -0.177
a.This table shows the sample average first-order autocorrelation and average
bias of the revisions of the Greenbook forecast, during the subperiods:
1994Q1-1997Q4 , 1998Q1-2001Q4 and 2002Q1-2005Q4.
Table 3.4: Average First-Order Autocorrelation and Average Bias of
the Revisions of the Greenbook Forecast in Subperiods
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Series GDP Deflator CPI Core CPI GDP Growth
Panel A: Nowcasts
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.826 1.048 1.263 0.997
1998Q1-2001Q4 1.208 1.204 0.805 0.907
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.742 0.865 1.050 1.277
Panel B: One-Quarter-Ahead Forecasts
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.783 1.099 1.043 1.067
1998Q1-2001Q4 1.113 1.272 1.177 1.034
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.689 0.731 1.078 1.204
Panel C: Two-Quarter-Ahead Forecasts
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.959 1.052 1.086 1.045
1998Q1-2001Q4 1.185 1.312 0.991 0.973
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.792 0.735 1.171 1.315
Panel D: Three-Quarter-Ahead Forecasts
1994Q1-1997Q4 1.101 0.925 1.057 1.065
1998Q1-2001Q4 1.173 1.209 0.967 0.947
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.833 0.726 1.190 1.351
Panel E: Four-Quarter-Ahead Forecasts
1994Q1-1997Q4 1.023 0.922 0.964 1.029
1998Q1-2001Q4 1.193 1.214 1.113 0.885
2002Q1-2005Q4 0.820 0.814 1.139 1.530
a.This table shows the rolling RRMSPEs of the adjusted forecasts to the Greenbook forecast
during the subperiods:1994Q1-1997Q4, 1998Q1-2001Q4 and 2002Q1-2005Q4. For Core CPI,
the RRMSPEs from 1996Q1 to 1997Q4 are computed for the first subperiod.
Table 3.5: Rolling RRMSPE of the Adjusted Forecasts to the Greenbook Forecasts
in Subperiods, with Forty-Quarter Window
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of the OLS Estimate












































Let σ2X , σ
2
ε , and σ
2
η as the variance of each shock. Then, the OLS estimate of α
















Accordingly, the bias of the OLS estimate is
α̂OLS − α =
(1− αβ)[δ(βδ + γ)σ2X + βσ
2
η]






Equation (A.5) indicates that the OLS estimate has a non-zero bias, unless
there is a certain restriction on parameters (such as αβ = 1). For the discussion
about the signs of the bias in the OLS estimates, see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2013).
A.2 Derivation of Conditional Variance







. Similarly, denote the conditional variances of the shocks






. Given the reduced-from
solution of the system in equation (A.2), the conditional variance-covariance



















































Assume that the variance of the monetary policy shock is larger on the an-
nouncement days than on the non-announcement days, but the variance of the












When taking the difference between ΩA and ΩĀ in equations (A.6) and (A.7),
only the variances of the monetary policy shock remain and the variances of












A.3 Orthogonality of Instruments
To see that the two instruments, zi and zs, are orthogonal to the residuals e,
compute
∑T





Zt · et = Z

































∆i′A · (∆sA − α∆iA)−
1
TĀ
∆i′Ā · (∆sĀ − α∆iĀ)
1
TA
∆s′A · (∆sA − α∆iA)−
1
TĀ








(Ω̂A,12 − αΩ̂A,11)− (Ω̂Ā,12 − αΩ̂Ā,11)


















Zt · et −→p 0 (A.18)
Accordingly, we have moment condition E[Zt · et] = 0.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2: Monte
Carlo Exercise
B.1 Construction of Artificial Projections
1. Estimate a reduced-form quarterly VAR(1) of four variables, GDP growth,
unemployment rate, PCE inflation and Core PCE inflation with a con-
stant:























1 0 · · · 0


























I use the vintage data of 2012 from 1984 to estimate A and the variance-
covariance matrix of ξt. Denote estimates as Â and Ξ̂.
2. Generate the artificial realized series using Â and Ξ̂, by assuming that ξt
is jointly normal.
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3. Construct the efficient quarterly projections by iterations as in Table B.1,
under the null hypothesis that the forecast is the conditional mean. I
assume that the realized value is not observable until the beginning of the
next period. (For example, v1 is observable at the beginning of period 2.)
Nowcast 1Q ahead · · · 12Q ahead
Period 1 Âv0 Â
2v0 · · · Â
13v0
2 Âv1 Â
2v1 · · · Â
13v1
3 Âv2 Â






Table B.1: Simulated Quarterly Projections
4. Construct the efficient yearly projections in accordance with FOMC’s pro-
jections, by assuming that period 1 is the fourth quarter of a year. Specifi-
cally, I pick the projection of the unemployment rate for the fourth quarter,
as in Table B.2. Similarly, I compute the projection of GDP growth and
inflation for the fourth quarter as the sum of realized values and quarterly
projections, as in Table B.3.1
Nowcast Year 1 Year 2 Year 3





















Table B.2: Simulated Yearly Projections of the Unemployment Rate
1These series are in continuously compounding rate of growth.
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Table B.3: Simulated Yearly Projections of GDP Growth and Inflation
B.2 Computation of Forecast Revisions (Size)
Based on the efficient yearly projections, I compute the revisions of the unem-
ployment rate projections as in Table B.4, and compute the revisions of GDP
growth and inflation projections as in Table B.5. Then, I apply the tests in this
paper to these revisions. By repeating the whole exercise many times, I report
the probability of rejections as the size of the tests.
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1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year · · ·



















8th Period Âv8 − Â
2v7 Â
5v8 − Â
6v7 · · ·
...
...
12th Period Âv12 − Â
2v11 · · ·
Table B.4: Simulated Revisions of the Unemployment Projections


































































Âkv7 · · ·
...
...




Âkv11 · · ·
Table B.5: Simulated Revisions of the GDP Growth and Inflation projections
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B.3 Construction of Inefficient Projections (Power)
To compute the power of the tests, construct the three types of inefficient fore-
casts. Denote the efficient forecast constructed in Section B.1 as ŷb,∗
t+h|t+j , for
time t + h made at time t+ j for 0 < j < h.





t+h|t+j + εt+h|t+j, (B.2)
where εt+h|t+j is an independent white noise.








where η is the parameter of the persistence in the noise such that 0 <
η < 1, and εt+j is an independent white noise. The forecaster receives
an independent noise every period, but this noise affects all forecasts at
different horizons. I set η = 0.8 in the simulation.





t+h|t+j + (1− δ)ŷ
b,∗
t+h|t+j−1, (B.4)
where δ is the parameter of the sluggishness in the adjustment such that
0 < δ < 1. The forecast is computed as the weighted average of efficient
forecasts in the current period and the previous period. I set δ = 0.5 in
the simulation.
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Given these inefficient forecasts, I apply the tests in this paper to the revi-
sions of these forecasts. By repeating the whole exercise many times, I report
the probability of rejections as the power of the tests.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3:
Construction of Bootstrap
P-values
The algorithm to construct bootstrap p-values is described as follows:
1. Fit AR(4) model to realized series, {yt};




φk yt−k + εt. (C.1)
2. Randomly resample residuals and create artificial sample, {ybt};









where α̂ and {φ̂k}
4
k=1 are estimated coefficients of AR(4) model in equation
(C.1), and ebt is a randomly resampled residual. I randomly pick a block
of four observations to set the initial observations of an artificial sample.
3. Calculate the conditional mean of an artificial sample at all horizons and
take it as an artificial Greenbook forecast. Specifically, the conditional
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t+h−k|t if h = 5
For the first four observations, I take the unconditional mean as the fore-
casts at all horizons.
4. Given an artificial sample and artificial Greenbook forecast, construct an




























are the coefficients from the forecast efficiency regression using artificial
data up until t. I plug the forecast for period t + h made h + j period




k=h , into the
estimated equation and treat its prediction as another forecast.
5. Repeat this procedure every period to obtain predictions. I take these
predictions as the artificial adjusted forecast.
6. Compute the RRMSPE of the artificial adjusted forecast to the artificial
Greenbook forecast. Unlike the procedure in Section 3.3, I assume that
the realized series are observable and never revised.
7. Repeat the steps 2 to 6 to form the distribution of the bootstrap RRMSPE.
I report p-values of the realized RRMSPE according to this distribution.
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